UNIT 2:PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main content
3.1 Basis of the doctrine
3.2 Application of the doctrine
3.3 Proprietary estoppel and constructive notice
3.4 Effect of the operation of the doctrine
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignments
7.0 References / Further Reading
1.0 INTRODUCTION
In the last unit we considered promissory estoppel as an equitable defense. In this unit, we will consider the second aspect which is proprietary estoppel. Where A expends money on land in the erroneous belief that he is the owner and B, the true owner, with the knowledge of A's error, de- liberately abstains from asserting his right and thereby encourage A to persist in his error, pro- prietary estoppel or estoppel by acquiescence will operate and B will not thereafter be allowed to assert his right in the land against A.
2.0 OBJECTIVES
By the end of this unit you should be able to:
(i) Explain the basis of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel;
(ii) Apply the doctrine of proprietary estoppel;
(iii) Link Proprietary estoppel and constructive notice; and
(iv) Explain the effect of the operation of the doctrine.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
3.1 Basis of the Doctrine
Conduct giving rise to estoppel may be passive or active. First inaction may amount to passive ac- quiescence upon which proprietary estoppel may be founded. Thus in Ramsden v. Dyson (l866)L.R. 1 H.L. 129 at 140-141, Lord Cranworth L.C. said:
'If a stranger begins to build on my land supposing it to be his own, and I, perceiving his mis- take, abstain from setting him right, and leave him to persevere in his error, a court of equity will not allow me afterwards to assert my title to the land in which he had expended money on the supposition that the land was his own. It considers that, when I saw the mistake into which he had fallen, it was my duty to be active and to state my adverse title, and that it would be dishonest in me to remain wilfully passive on such an occasion in order afterwards to profit by the mistake which I might have prevented. But it will be observed that to raise such an eq- uity, two things are required, first, that the person expending his money supposes himself to be building on his own land; and, secondly, that the real owner at the time of the expenditure knows that the land belongs to him and not to the person expending the money in the belief that he is the owner. For if a stranger builds on my land knowing it to be mine, there is no principle of equity which would prevent my claiming the land with the benefit of all the ex- penditure, made on it. There would be nothing in my conduct, active or passive, making it in- equitable in me to assert my legal rights.'
Secondly, conduct encouraging such expenditure as referred to in Lord Cranworth's proposition oth- erwise known as the rule in Ramsden v. Dyson may amount to active acquiescence capable of support- ing a claim of proprietary estoppel. 'If A puts B into possession of a piece ofland, and tells him, 'I give it to you that you may build a house on it', and B on the strength of that promise, with the know- ledge of A, expends a large sum of money in building a house accordingly, I cannot doubt that the donee acquires a right from the subsequent transaction to call on the donor to perform that contract and complete the imperfect donation that was made.' Per Lord Westbury L.C. in Dilwyn v. Llewellyn (1862) 4 De G.F. & J. 517 at 521; 45 E.R. 1285.
It is reasonably clear that the basis of the doctrine is fraud as manifested in the conduct of the owner of the land; for a person is not to be deprived of his legal rights unless he has acted in such a way as would make it fraudulent for him to set up those rights. See Fry J. in Willmott v. Barber (1880) 15 Ch.D. 96 at 105. It is evidently fraudulent for a true owner of land, in the circumstances explained in Ramsden v. Dyson and in Dillwyn v. Llewellyn, to set up his title with a view to claiming the land with the improvements made on it by the mistaken party to the knowledge and with the passive or active acquiescence of the true owner.
However, for the court to restrain the owner of a legal right from exercising it on the plea of proprie- tary estoppel by the person who has expended money, certain requisites must be established. These were stated by Fry J., in Willmott v. Barber (supra).
(i) First, P who has expended money on the land must have been mistaken as to his legal right in the land; he must have genuinely believed though, erroneously, that he was the owner of the land;
(ii) P, acting on the faith of his mistaken belief, must have expended some money or must have done some act which will be pre-judicial to him if D the true owner of the land were subsequently allowed to set up his right against P;
(iii) D, the true owner, must have known of the existence of his own right which is inconsistent with the right claimed by P. If D was unaware that he was the owner of the land the plea of proprietary estoppel will not be sustained; see Armstrong v. Sheppard & Short Ltd. (1959) 2 Q.B. 384.
There cannot be conduct amounting to acquiescence, an essential element of the doctrine, where the true owner was not aware of his right and, therefore, could not be said to have knowledge of or to have acquiesced to any infringement of such right;
(iv) D must have known of P's mistaken belief of his rights in the land, such knowledge will raise an equity in favour of P and make it inequitable for D to subsequently set up his title against P;
(v) D must have encouraged P in his expenditure of money or in other acts which P has done either directly or by abstaining from asserting his legal rights.
The foregoing elements must co-exist in order to establish a plea of proprietary estoppel.
In Ozokpo v. Paul (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 133) p.494, the case for the respondent is that, her father made a grant of a piece of land to her. It is part of a portion of land given to her father by her grand- father. The land was given to her in 1956. She and her mother farmed on it planting cassava, vegeta- bles, okro, etc. sometime in the 1950s, she saw one Ogbuka developing the said land. In spite of warnings from her and her father, Ogbuka erected a building on the land. Ogbuka sold the house in 1958 to Ozokpo and Ozokpo moved into the house. He took on tenants and then the civil war broke out.
Ozokpo fled to Portharcourt with his family and abandoned the property leaving behind his personal belongings and documents of title relating to the property. In the absence of Ozokpo, the respondent (Justina Paul) moved into the building and took possession, saying the building was erected on her land without her consent. Ozokpo died before the end of the war. His widow got back from Porthar- court and tried to get the house back. The respondent refused to give up possession. Mrs. Ozokpo applied for and obtained letters of administration to manage the estate of Ozokpo. As the respondent would not give up possession, Mrs. Ozokpo (appellant) took out an action against the respondent for arears of rent in the Magistrate Court in Portharcourt and she got judgment in her favour. The res- pondent (Paul) paid up arrears of rent owed.
The Court held that a tenant who pays rent to another as landlord with full knowledge of the fact that he was not the sole owner of the property, is stopped from subsequently denying the landlord’s title. It was dishonest of the respondent to move into the house when Ozokpo died reaping where she did not sow. There is even no evidence that the respondent ever protested to Ozokpo in respect of the property when he was alive.
3.2 Appication of the Doctrine
The doctrine has found favour in Nigerian Courts though it is sometimes confused with the doctrine of laches. In Rafat v. Ellis (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 430 at 431, a creditor obtained judgment against the plaintiff's sister and attached the judgment debtor's unoccupied family property which was sold un- der a writ of fifa to the defendant. However, the transaction was void since the subject-matter of the sale was family property in which the plaintiff's sister had no alienable interest, and the family never consented to the sale. The plaintiff admitted that he heard of the sale some time in 1942 and alleged
that he promptly instructed his solicitor to investigate and take action. In fact, the solicitor did noth- ing until September 1945 when he wrote a letter to the defendant asserting the plaintiff's title. By that time the defendant had erected a substantial building on the land. The defendant relied on the con- duct of the plaintiff and the members of his family in standing by from 1942 to 1945 and permitting the defendant to erect a substantial building without any indication to him that there was a defect in his title.
Windsor-Aubrey J., delivering the judgment of the West African Court of Appeal, observed that the question the court had to decide was whether the plaintiff was estopped by laches and acquiescence, from claiming the property. It was held that the defendant had successfully raised the defence of es- toppel under the rule in Ramdsden v. Dyson. The principle is that the person expending the money must suppose himself to be building on his own land; in, this case the land in question was unoccu- pied and it was purchased under an execution sale; the circumstances were such that the defendant could reasonably believe that he was acquiring a good title to the property. Secondly, the plaintiff and members of his family were found to have knowingly acquiesced to the defendant's activities on the land, for, 'there was nothing to prevent them instituting an action for a declaration of title in 1942', since that time 'the members of the plaintiff's family were well aware of the erection of the building by the defendant and deliberately stood by until the building was completed.'
On these facts, the court found that 'This is not a question of the plaintiff and his family simply neg- lecting to enforce a claim', and therefore, on the principle of Ramsden v. Dyson, 'they must, by their conduct, be held to have acquiesced, and knowingly permitted the defendant to incur expenditure on renovating and adding to the building. They have thereby waived and abandoned any rights which they possessed, and cannot now enforce them'.
3.3 Proprietary Estoppel and Constructive Notice
In the earlier case of Morayo v. Okiade (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 46, the West African Court of Appeal approved of the equitable rule as stated in Caincross v. Lorimer (1860) 3 L.T. 130, and as expanded in Ramsden v. Dyson (supra).
'It is a rule of universal law that if a man either by word or by conduct has intimated that he consents to an act which has been done and that he will offer no opposition to it, although it could not have been lawfully done without his consent and he thereby induces others to do that from which they otherwise might have abstained he cannot question the legality of the act he had so sanctioned to the prejudice of those who have given faith to his word, or to the fair inference to be drawn from his conduct. In such cases, proof of positive assent or concurrence is unnecessary; it is enough that the party had full notice of what was being done and the posi- tion of the other party is altered'.
But the question the court had to decide was whether a stranger, who mistakenly incurred expendi- ture on land with the passive or active acquiescence of the real owner, is precluded from setting up the rule in Ramsden v. Dyson on the ground that he had constructive notice of the real owner's title. In that case, there was evidence before the trial court that the plaintiff did all within her power to ap- prise the defendant of her claim to the property but in spite of that knowledge the defendant em- barked on the erection of the building. See Morayo v. Okiade (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 46 at 48.
It was, therefore, clear to the Appeal Court (though this evidence was lost sight of by the trial judge, due to inaccurate exposition of facts) that the plaintiff/appellant ought not to have been estopped in view of the principle in Rennie v. Young (1858) 2 De. G. & J. 136.44 E.R 939 which is consistent with the rule in Ramsden v. Dyson (supra)that the equitable rule as to the effect of a person's lying by and allowing another to expend money on his property does not apply when the money is expended with knowledge of the real state of the title.
But the Appeal Court went further to say 'We are unable to reconcile the learned Judge's finding, namely that 'the defendants admit that they made no inquiries as to Oshodi's title and must be held to have had constructive notice of the documents on which their title was based namely the auctioneer's receipt and plaintiff's own conveyance' with his decision that the plaintiff/appellant is estopped. We are of the opinion that having held that the defendant/respondent had constructive notice of the ap- pellant's title he was precluded on the authority of Rennie v. Young from finding that acquiescence on the part of the appellant operated as estoppel.' See Morayo v. Okiade (supra) at 48.
No doubt, the question of constructive notice is unnecessary for his decision, since it has been found that the defendant/respondent had actual notice of the real owner's title. However, it would appear to be the view of the court that constructive notice as distinct from actual notice precludes the operation of the rule in Ramdsden v. Dyson (supra) thereby narrowing the area of operation of the rule.
The importance of constructive notice as it affects the operation of the rule in Ramsden v. Dyson was further considered by the Supreme Court in Owodunni v. George (1967) 1 All N.L.R 177. In that case both plaintiff and defendant claimed to have derived their competing titles from one Eyisha family who originally owned the land in dispute. The defendant denied the earlier title of the plaintiff and claimed that he had been in an undisturbed possession of the land for several years and that he had expended money in erecting buildings on the land. He relied on laches and acquiescence, though the defence was treated as equitable estoppel.
The trial court upheld the superior title of the plaintiff; it, however recognised the equity of the de- fendant's case; he built without any warning from the plaintiff of his claim to title, nevertheless, it was held that the defendant must lose because he could have found out that the plaintiff had a supe- rior claim to the land. On appeal, the counsel for the plaintiff conceded that the judgment of the low- er court recognised the equity of the defendant/appellant's case, but rejected it on the ground of con- structive notice, he therefore, sought to support this ground of rejection by citing the earlier decision of the West African Court of Appeal in Morayo v. Okiade (supra).
In its judgment, the Supreme Court approved of Ramsden v. Dyson (supra) as ably expanded by Fry J., in Willmott v. Barber (supra). It, however, rejected the view that constructive notice precludes the opera- tion of the rule. Bairamian J.S.C. said:
'The defendant bought with a conveyance and built at great expense on the land in the belief, here assumed for this aspect of the appeal to have been mistaken, that the land was his; the plaintiff knew about it and regarded the land as his own, but did not warn him, and now wants the land and buildings for himself. The trial judge grants it to him on the basis that the defen- dant ought not to have made a mistake on the ground of what is usually described as construc- tive notice, but with respect, that is helping the plaintiff to reap the fraudulent fruit of standing by, and the equity of the defendant's case must prevail.'
See Owodunni v. George (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 177, 181-182.
Thus, the Supreme Court refused to follow Morayo v. Okiade (supra) on the ground that the observations of Turner L.J. in Rennie v. Young (supra) which the West African Court of Appeal relied upon in that case do not warrant the engrafting of 'constructive notice' upon the doctrine of standing by. (See Owodunni v. George (supra) at 183). In support of this contention the Supreme Court relied on the view of Fry J., in Willmott v. Barber (supra) at 101,106 where he said as follows-
'The equitable doctrine of acquiescence is founded on there having been a mistake of fact; can it be repelled by showing that there was constructive notice of the real facts? In every case in which a man acts under the mistaken belief that he is entitled to land, he might, if he had inquired, have found out that he had no title. And yet the courts appear always to have inquired simply whether a mistake has been made, not whether the plaintiff ought to have made it.'
The position now, with regard to the relevance of constructive notice to the operation of equitable estoppel, is that whenever a person is seeking the relief, not on a contract, but on the footing of a mistake of fact, the mistake is not the less a ground for relief because he had the means of knowl- edge. As has been stated earlier, the doctrine of constructive notice is a dangerous one, in that it is contrary to the truth; being wholly founded on the assumption that a person does not know the facts; and yet it is said that constructively he does know them; it is a doctrine which ought not to be extended further beyond its traditional area of operation, otherwise, it may defeat the end of justice which the judges who invented it wanted to serve.
SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
What is the importance of constructive notice as it affects the operation of the rule in Rams- den v. Dyson?
3.5 The Effect of the Operation of the Doctrine
Proprietary estoppel or equitable estoppel gives rise to a permanent modification of the rights of the parties and those of their successors in title; unlike promissory estoppel whose effect is as a rule, temporary of suspensory. Moreover, proprietary estoppel can be used either as a shield or as a sword. In other words, it is capable of creating substantive rights upon which a cause of action may be founded. See the following: Dillwyn v. Llewelyn (1862) 4 De G.F. & J. 517; 45 E.R. 1285. Tho- mas v. Thomas (1956) N.Z.L.R. 785; Ibadan City Council v. Ajanaku (1969) N.M.L.R. 32.
Whenever the plea is sustained, it creates an equity in favour of the person who has expended money on the land and, the real owner of the land will henceforth be prevented from exercising or asserting his legal rights in respect of the land. However, the question remains as to whether the person who has expended money will be given compensation for the money so· expended or he is entitled to conveyance. There is much uncertainty as to the kind of order the court will make whenever the relief is granted. There does not appear to be any general rule as to the proper order. Thus, the court must look at the circumstances in each case to decide in what way the equity can be satisfied. See Lord Denning MR in E.R. Investment Ltd. v. High (1967), 2 Q.B. 379 at 395. It is however, reasonably clear that in giving effect to the kind of equity so created, the courts have ex- ercised a very wide discretion in making such an order as will do substantial justice between the parties and settle all outstanding questions between them. See Aileru v. Ademuoye (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 271 at 274.
The matter was considered by the Supreme Court in Aileru v. Ademuoye (supra). In that case, plain- tiffs, representing the Ojuwoye community, were the owners under native law and custom, of the land in dispute. They brought this action claiming, inter alia, a declaration of title to the land. The defendant claimed that he had become the fee simple owner of the land by virtue of a deed of conveyance executed by certain members of the plaintiffs' community; that he had entered the land, expended a large sum in erecting substantial buildings on it to the knowledge of and without any indication of the interest of the plaintiffs in the land.
The trial judge found that the community was the owners of the land and that the vendors had no authority to sell it. The trial judge held that the plaintiffs were guilty of lying by while the defen- dant was expending money on the land under the mistaken belief and to the knowledge of the plaintiffs, that he, the defendant owned the land. Nevertheless, the trial judge granted the plain- tiffs a declaration of title but dismissed their claim to other forms of relief which in effect con- firmed the right of the defendant to possession and prevented the plaintiffs from exercising their legal rights as owners of the land.
On appeal, the question the Supreme Court had to decide was whether the judgment of the lower court as a whole did the fullest possible justice between the parties and whether it should be va- ried in any way. It was the view of the court that what the defendant had in the events that had taken place was not an equitable interest in the land but an equity and that where such an equity is created by the acquiescence of the owner of the land, the person who has expended money will be entitled to have supposed title confirmed or, at any rate, to be compensated for his outlay.
On this holding the court adjourned the appeal so that the plaintiffs might consider whether to offer the defendant, the owner of the equity, compensation for the expense he had incurred and also that defendant might consider whether to counter-claim for a conveyance of the land and to offer to pay the plaintiffs the value of the land as it was when he took possession of it. It later transpired that the plaintiffs offered the defendant compensation which the defendant rejected claiming that his equity would not thereby be satisfied by the compensation. The Supreme Court held that in the circums- tances of the case the defendant's equity would not be satisfied by allowing plaintiffs to pay him compensation.
Enforcement of the equity so created in favour of the person who has expended money on land de- pends upon the circumstances of each case. See E.R lves. Investments Ltd. v. High (supra), Aileru v. Ademuoye (supra). Thus, the court has a wide discretion limited only by the circumstances of the case and the duty of the court to ensure substantial justice between the parties. Indeed, the exercise of the jurisdiction is correctly described as equity at its most flexible. See Danckwerts L.J. in E.R Investments Ltd. v. High (supra) at 399.
However, the guiding principle seems to be the desire of the court to ensure, as much as possible, the fulfillment of the expectations of the owner of the equity in expending money on the land. 'It is quite plain' observed Lord Denning M.R. in Inwards v. Baker (1965) 2 Q.B. 29; (1965) 1 All E.R. 446, 'that if the owner of land requests another, or indeed allows another, to expend money on the land under an expectation created or encouraged by the landlord that he will be able to remain there, that raises an equity in the person so encouraged such as to entitle him to stay'. (1965) 1 All E.R. 446 at 448.
In Duke of Beaufort v. Patrick (1853) 17 Beav. 60 at 79-80; 51 E.R. 954, the equity was satisfied by a conveyance of the land to the owner of the equity on his offer to pay compensation. The court might itself determine the amount of compensation. In Dillwyn v. Llewelyn (1882) De G.F. & J. 517 at 522; 45 E.R. 1285, the father placed his son, the plaintiff, in possession of his land and at the same time signed a memorandum presenting the land to the plaintiff so that the plaintiff could build on it a dwelling house of his own. The plaintiff, with the assent and encouragement of the father, built at his own expense, a house upon the land and resided there.
At his father's death, the plaintiff brought this action against the father's personal representatives, claiming to be entitled to a conveyance of the fee simple. His expectations at the time he was building on the land were that he would be allowed to remain on the land and that he would even- tually become the absolute owner of it. It was held that he was entitled to call for a conveyance of the fee simple being the best possible way in which his equity could be satisfied. Lord Westbury L.C. said:
'The equity of the donee and the estate to be claimed by virtue of it depend on the transac- tion, that is, on the acts done, and not on the language of the memorandum, except as that shows the purpose and intent of the gift. The estate was given as the site of a dwelling-house to be erected by the son. The ownership of the dwelling-house and the ownership of the es- tate must be considered as intended to be co-extensive and co-equal.'
Here, in Dillwyn v. Llewelyn, proprietary estoppel was used as a sword. In the New Zealand case of Thomas v. Thomas (1956) N.Z.L.R. 785 at 793, the equity of the wife, who had expended mon- ey on her husband's land, was satisfied by an order compelling the husband, the real owner of the land to convey the fee simple to the wife. In the case Gresson J. observed as follows: 'If Dillwyn v. Llewelyn in case of equitable estoppel by acquiescence (and it is susceptible of being so regarded)
'it is an authority for the use of that doctrine as a sword and not merely as a shield. The son did not content himself with resisting eviction but asserted a claim which was upheld to the point of hold- ing him entitled to a conveyance.'
In Attorney-General v. John Holt & Co. (1910) 2 N.L.R. 1 at 16, the defendants had incurred ex- penditure in reclaiming the plaintiff's land which defendants were using for their own business to the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs. Osborne C.J. refused the plaintiffs' claim for an injunc- tion but the defendants were granted a declaration that their rights to remain and use the land for their business was irrevocable and perpetual. In the course of his judgment the Chief Justice said:
‘ ... On the strength of the understanding the defendants' predecessors in title expended money in reclamation and building ... on the authority of Plimmer v. Mayor, etc., of Wel- lington (1884) 9 App. Cas. 699, that licence of the Crown is now irrevocable, and being of indefinite duration, perpetual. I hold, therefore, that the respective defendants and those claiming under them have acquired, as to so much of the land adjoining that comprised in the respective Crown grants under which they claim, as consisted of foreshore and bed of the lagoon reclaimed by themselves or their predecessors in title, a perpetual right to place and store such things thereon ... .’
The fulfilment of the expectation of the person expending money is an important influencing factor in making an order that will satisfy the equity so created. In Inwards v. Baker (1965) 1 All E.R. 446 at 449, the son who had built a bungalow on his father's land with the intention of residing there and making it his home was held entitled to stay there so long as he wished it to remain his home. 'The court will not allow the expectation to be defeated where it would be inequitable so to do. In this case, it is quite plain that the father allowed an expectation to be created in the son's mind that this bungalow was to be his home. It was to be his home for his life, or at all events, his home so long as he wished it to remain his home'.
This was followed by the Supreme Court in Ibadan City Council & Anor v. Ajanaku (1969) N.M.L.R. 32 at 37-38. The defendant’s predecessor-in-title had purportedly granted a lease of land to the plaintiff's predecessorin-title free of rent and for such period as he and his successor-in- title should occupy the land. It was a void lease but the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-title had ex- pended money on the land and were in undisturbed possession.
The Supreme Court held that:
'This was sufficient to create an expectation in the minds of the plaintiff’s predecessor and his successors-in-title that they are entitled to remain in occupation of the land free of rent for an indefinite period. It seems to us only reasonable to infer that it was on the strength of this that buildings were erected on the land by the plaintiff. 'In these circumstances, we con- sider that an equity was created by estoppel to safeguard the plaintiff's interest and protect the buildings he erected on the land. As against the defendant/appellant whose predecessor in title was a party to the purported grant of lease, equity will therefore come to the aid of the plaintiff to ensure that injustice is not perpetrated and that he and his successors are al- lowed to remain on the land for an indefinite period free of rent.'
In some other cases, the real owner of the land may be ordered to pay compensation in satisfac- tion of the equity of the person who has expended money on the land (see Unity Joint-Stock Mu- tual Banking Association v. King (1888) 25 Beav. 72; 53 E.R. 563) or in the alternative the per- son who has made the expenditure may be granted an equitable lien on the property, this would serve as security for the money so expended with the encouragement or acquiescence of the real owner. See Chalmers v. Pardoe (1963) 1 W.L.R. 677 at 681-682, where it was stated that:
'There can be no doubt upon the authorities' observed Sir Terence Donovan, 'that where an owner of land has invited or expressly encouraged another to expend money upon part of his land upon the faith of an assurance or promise that that part of the land will be made over to the person so expending his money, a court of equity will prima facie require the owner by appropriate conveyance to fulfil his obligation; and when, for exam- ple, for reasons of title, no such conveyance can effectively be made, a court of equity may declare that the person who has expended the money is entitled to an equitable charge or lien for the amount so expended.'
The court must look at the circumstances in each case to decide in what way the equity can be satisfied. See Plimmer v. Wellington Corporation (1884) 9 App. Cas. 699, 714 P.C.
4.0 CONCLUSION
Proprietary estoppel or equitable estoppel gives rise to a permanent modification of the rights of the parties and those of their successors in title. Moreover, it can be used either as a shield or as a sword. It is reasonably clear that the basis of the doctrine is fraud as manifested in the conduct of the owner of the land; for a person is not to be deprived of his legal rights unless he has acted in such a way as would make it fraudulent for him to set up those rights.
5.0 SUMMARY
In this unit we have considered another equitable defence. You should now be able to: explain the basis of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel; apply the doctrine of proprietary estoppel; link proprietary estoppel and constructive notice; and explain the effect of the operation of the doc- trine.
6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT
Briefly explain the effect of the operation of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.
7.0 REFERENCES / FURTHER READING
Hackney J., (1987) Understanding Equity and Trusts; London: Fontana press
Jegede M. I. (2007rep.) Principles of Equity; Ibadan: Unique Design/Prints Nwagbara Chigozie (2004 Rev.Ed.) Selected Cases on Land Law, Equity, Trusts, Taxation, Banking and Conflict of Laws; Lagos: CI Publications.