THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  NATURAL   JUSTICE AND

THEIR APPLICATIONS IN NIGERIA THROUGH CASES

CONTENTS

1.0       Introduction

2.0       Objectives

• Main Content
• Natural Justice
• The Nigerian Experiment
• Witnesses and Natural Justice
• Locus Standi

4.0       Conclusion

5.0       Summary

6.0       Tutor-Marked Assignment

7.0       References/Further Readings

INTRODUCTION

This unit deals with natural justice and its application in Nigeria. We will consider various examples in Nigeria and the attitude of the court.

OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

identify the various course opened to a person whose right is being or will be and have been infringed upon.

MAIN CONTENT

Natural Justice

The expression "natural justice" has been described as one sadly lacking in precision, and it has been consigned more than once to the lumber room. This expression has many historical, episcopal and philosophical connotations. For instance, Leeds remarked that various meanings have been attached to the word "Justice"; and at one breadth it means benefits according to merit and worth. This followed the philosophy of Aristotle and Greek Philosophers who stated that those who contributed most to the society should be greatly rewarded. However, by the 16^th Century, important changes were introduced and a new idea in quest for justice was introduced. This made the socialists to state that everyone in the society should be treated according to his needs. It means therefore that those who are poor would be better satisfied by the law of nature than those who are rich. They must be satisfied even at the expense of the rich.

However, after the 19^th Century, some lawyers have come to associate natural law or justice with the law of the land; because the state exists to achieve certain purposes which are: the good life of the community. The law is therefore the instrument by which these purposes or ends are made possible, and the law can be fully understood only when considered in relation to its object which is justice. In the main, one deduce by legal history that from quite a considerable period of time the Greeks have been trying to seek the existence of an ideal law, by which the fitness of ordinary law could be tested. And this ultimate law, according to Salt and Sinclair, has been known as natural law. To hit the nail on the head, Aristotle confirmed that we have both natural justice and the conventional justice.

To him, natural justice is recognised everywhere by civilized men and the conventional justice is binding only because some lawgivers have laid them down. However, it must be accepted that natural law is the same thing as natural justice which prevents the adjudication of disputes with a biased mind. It prevents unfairness and upholds equality of treatment according to law. Natural law exists from the time of our Lord as would be found in the Bible, and today what is important is that all adjudicators should see that justice is not only being done but that it must be manifestly seen to be done.

Hence the principles of British justice stipulate that there must be a fair play in settling action. Therefore, natural justice links up the common law with moral principles. The principles then state 'that a man can only be deemed to have justice if he is heard in his own defence. This is called the principle of "audi alteram partem” - De-Smith puts it as follows: "No proposition can be more clearly established than that a  man cannot incur the loss of liberty or property for an offence until he has had a fair opportunity of answering the case against him" ... That is  a man must be given adequate, opportunity to reply to them. This notion has been accorded importance both in England and also in Nigeria.

As a matter of fact, the Federal Supreme Court laid it down  emphatically in Sule Katagun and Others Case that no enquiry should  be conducted without the application of the principles of natural justice. This rule is given recognition also by God, and it was applied to Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. De-Smith confirms this when he said:-

"Even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. God said to Adam, "Where art thou"? Has thou not eaten out of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou should not eat? 

It is also pointed out in John, Chapter Seventhat our Lord would not judge a man or condemn him without hearing him. The verse states: "Doth our Lord Judge any man, before it hears him and knows what he doeth".

This principle of audi alteram partem is further explained in Genesis, Chapter Four, verse nine 4 when Cain's offering was rejected and he killed his brother Abel whose own offering was accepted by-God: This killing was done in anger and God knew that the brutal act has been committed by Cain, but instead of punishing Cain outright, the Lord gave him an opportunity to defend himself. And thus, God asked Cain: "Where is Abel thy brother?" And he answered: "I know not, Am I my brother's keeper?" Then God confessed that Abel's blood has cried unto him from the ground and hence Cain was punished accordingly· in the following words:-

"When thou tillest the ground, it shall not henceforth yield unto thee her strength; a· fugitive and vagabond shall thou be on earth".

The right to be heard in one's own defence is also embodied into the Nigerian Constitution while its concept has been amplified by Denning M.R., in this way:

~'If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth noting it must carry with it a right in the accused mail to know the case which  has been given and what statements have been made affecting him, and then he must be given a f air opportunity to correct or contradict them."

It is therefore apparent that any administrative body, Court or corporate personality which fails to observe this principle acts contrary to, and in defiance of, the rules of natural justice. And judgment therefore made as a result of the breach of the rule of natural justice cannot stand, even if the plaintiff or the accused is wrong.

This was the view expressed by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Stephen Adedeji v. Police Service Commission as follows:-

"We are therefore not satisfied that when the circumstances of this case are looked into, adequate opportunity was given to the appellant to meet the case or the facts of the case known to the Commission".

It is possible that the appellant is corrupt and did commit the offence alleged against him that is not what we have to consider. Was the case against him sufficiently brought home to him that one can say that the requirements of natural justice were sufficiently observed on the facts and circumstances?

We hereby order that the writ should go and the letter dismissing the appellant is hereby declared inoperative, void and of no effect".

The other rule to observe under the principle of natural justice is "Nemo Judex in Causa Sua" - that is that a person shall not be a judge in his  own cause, which is the same thing as saying that nobody can be both  an accuser and accused, and at the same time to be a judge of a matter in dispute. This evidently is to eliminate the possibility of bias in. such a proceeding.

Having discussed the two main principles of Natural Justice, let us now consider their applications in Nigerian context through cases and further modifications.

The Nigerian Experiment

Ancillary to these two principles may be mentioned the following,  which are to a considerable extent supported by some decided cases - For instance, in the Queen v. Local Government Eastern Region, Ex- Parte Oka/or Chigbana. The Federal Supreme Court in Nigerian held that a Court must act in good faith, listen fairly to both sides and give fair opportunity to the parties adequately to present their case and to correct or contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to their views. These directives are in consonant with the requirements of Natural Justice, and if a Court does anything in flagrant contradiction to these directives, his judgement may be successfully challenged on appeal.

Also it is imperative that a Court must endeavour to see at all times.  That the man standing trial understands the language being used during the Court's proceedings. In case of a man who speaks another language, therefore an interpreter must be made available to him so as to enable him to know the case he is facing and to prepare him properly for defences on it.

In other words, the language must be properly interpreted to give him an opportunity to defend himself. For every person who is charged with a criminal offence for example shall be entitled to have without payment the assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand the language  used at the trial of the offence. Any negation of this principle therefore definitely contravenes not only the Constitutional provision of Nigeria, but also the principle of natural justice.

This was in fact established in the case of Buraima Ajayi and Julande Jos v. Zaria Native Authoritywhere the appellant successfully appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's refusal to interfere with their conviction in a Native Court on the ground that the interpretation in the Native Court had been unsatisfactory. The proceedings in the Native Court were in Hausa, which the appellants neither spoke nor understood. They were Yoruba speakers by birth and understood English, but not perfectly. The proceedings were interpreted by five different interpreters at successive stages: two interpreted into English and one into Yoruba. It did not appear what language the others interpreted into. None of them was sworn. The trial record gave their names but it did not appear how they came to be called on to interpret or who they were, except that one was a school boy and others were those who spoke English but not Yoruba. Only one gave evidence in the High Court. The High Court found that in at least two occasions the ability of the interpreters satisfactorily might be questioned, but that in fact, the whole proceedings has been interpreted correctly.

On appeal it was held amidst all other facts that this is wrong. It  deprives the appellants of their Constitutional rights and that it contravened the principles of natural justice which demand that justice needs not only be done, but must be manifestly seen done. Put  succinctly the Supreme Court held as follows:-

"It was essential to be satisfied that no appellants had a fair opportunity to defend themselves and in particular that they were accorded in full  the right conferred by section 21 (5)(e) of the Constitution of the Federation, which requires that there shall be adequate interpretation to the accused person of anything said in a language that he does not understand, and equally that there shall be adequate interpretation to the Court of anything said by the accused person in a language that the Court does not understand. The Court further held that there is a failure of justice within the meaning of section 382 of the criminal code if the proceedings at the trial fall short of the requirement not only that justice be done but that it may be seen to be done, as that maxim has been applied by the Judicial Committee in Adem Haji Jama v. The Kinlo and by the Queen's Bench Division in such cases as Reg v. East Kerrier Justices Ex-Parte Munday.

Adjournments

It is also established in many cases and statutes that a Court must ensure that it grants legitimate adjournments to litigants so as to enable the~ prepare well for their cases and to afford them such opportunities to defend themselves. This is a part of the fundamental rule of natural justice.

In other words, if a party to a dispute has necessarily excused himself from appearance and that he could not be reasonably expected to attend the hearing of the case against him, it will be a void judgement if a decision is given against him in default of appearance. This proposition was well established in the case of Alhaji Ramonu Bello and Dr. M.o. Thomson. In this case, the appellant was not given opportunity of presenting his case because notwithstanding the fact that a medical certificate of illness was sent to the Court and that his Counsel asked for an adjournment, the trial judge continued with the case and granted the Counsel a leave to withdraw from it accordingly.

The Court of Appeal held this to be wrong and that it tantamounts to a denial of justice. The course taken by the learned trial judge was held to be unfair, and prejudicial to the appellant who was thereby denied the opportunity of presenting his defence fully.

Also it is categorically stated that this step adopted by the trial judge has engendered a miscarriage of justice and interference was accordingly allowed by the Court of Appeal as it was done in the case of Maxwell v. Keun.

As a matter of fact, the same ratio decidendi was reached in the case of Solanke v. Ajibola when notwithstanding an application  for adjournment owing to illness coupled with the tenacious denial of the plaintiffs claim, the learned trial judge continued with the case in the defendant's absence and held that the defendant was not willing to defend the action. The Supreme Court held this action of the learned  trial judge to be manifestly unjust and a total denial of justice because his discretion was not legally exercised in the circumstances by refusing an adjournment and not taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration.

The Court concluded as follows emphatically:

"We do consider that this is an appeal where it has been shown that the exercise of the learned trial judge's discretion has worked hardship and injustice on the defendant. We must therefore allow this appeal." Cases on this type of denial of justice are many, and for brevity purposes, let  us consider the case of A.A. Odusote v. 0. 0. Odusote. Here the junior Counsel applied for an adjournment because his senior - the leading Counsel and apparently one who had all the relevant facts of the case and file - was not present. This application was refused by the Appeal Court and argument on the appeal continued.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held as follows:

"With respect we are satisfied that in the circumstances of the present case, the Court of Appeal was in error in refusing the application for adjournment and dismissing the appeal, especially as the appellant was by herself not present in Court and there was no evidence that she knew the appeal was fixed for hearing that day.

It cannot be denied that the dismissal of the appeal in the circumstances has occasioned a miscarriage of justice, and it will be wrong for us to hold that the Court was justified in dismissing the appeal or that it was exercising its discretion properly and judicially in so acting".

It must however be noted that frivolous adjournments should not be granted as stipulated by law. This obviously is the deduction arrived at from the case of Tsaku v. The State which establishes the following propositions:

1. That the granting or refusal of an application for adjournment is a matter which calls for the exercise of discretion by the Court. And as in all cases of discretion, the power must be exercised judicially and in the interest of justice.
2. That it is the duty of a person seeking the indulgence of the Court to satisfy it that he is deserving of the favour he seeks, and this he can do by pointing to facts and circumstances tending to establish that injustice would result from a failure to grant the application. In Short, there must be sufficient material before the Court to justify the exercise of the discretion as it was decided in Demuren Asuni.
3. That where in a given case it is conclusively established that the trial of the case has been conducted in such a way as to lead but to the conclusion that an accused person was not offered adequate or full opportunity to put across his case, as for example, when an application for adjournment has unreasonably or capriciously been refused or that the right to call a witness whose evidence is material to the just determination of the case has been denied, a Court of Appeal will undoubtedly interfere with the judgement of the trial Court and hold that a failure of justice has been occasioned.
4. That every person who is tried for a criminal offence must be given full opportunity to present his case and to call witnesses in his defence. Any failure on the part of the trial Judge/Court to give an accused person that full opportunity is a breach of Natural Justice as it was decided in the case of Ngubdo The State.
5. That there is a failure of justice if the proceedings of the trial fall short of the requirement not only that justice be done, but that it may be seen to be done as it was decided also in the case of Buraima Ajayi and Another Zaria Native Authority.

While it is the binding duty of a Court to act in conformity with the principles of Natural Justice and grant adjournments when the occasions are justifiable, yet it must be noted as a rule of practice that non- attendance of parties or of a party at a hearing may be fatal. For instance where a case on the cause list has been called, and neither party appears, the Court shall, unless it see good reasons to the contrary, strike the case out of the cause list.

If on the other hand, the plaintiff does not appear, the Court shall unless it sees good reason to the contrary, strike out the case (except as to any counterclaim by the defendant) and make such order as to costs  in favour of any defendant appearing as seems just. Provided that if the defendant shall admit the cause of action to the full amount claimed, the Court may, if it thinks fit, give judgment as if the plaintiff had appeared.

Lastly, if the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear or sufficiently excuse his absence, or neglects to answer when called, the Court may, upon proof of service of the summons, proceed to hear the cause and give judgment on the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, or may grant postponement to be given to the defendant.

Any compliance with any directive contained in the above provisions does not constitute a denial of justice, but it is a mere procedural device to ensure quick dispensation or disposition or justice; for justice delayed even at times is justice denied.

Therefore a strict adherence to these rules of practice will not render a judgement nugatory, notwithstanding the fact that certain refusals to adjourn, to permit to cross examine, to affix penalty after the hearing of a case may be a violation of the rules of natural justice.

All these cases have really established the principle that it is contrary to natural justice not to give any person a reasonable opportunity to be heard in any case which involves him.

One may wonder at this stage for the real meaning of “reasonable opportunity" in the circumstances which conforms with the "audi alteram partem principle" - since eggs are eggs and yet some are rotten. However in the matter of the' Constituent Assembly Decree No. 50 of 1977 and Dr. Ibrahim Datti Ahmed the expression was well explained. In this case, the electoral commission wrongfully excluded the applicant's name from contesting an election when as a matter of fact he was qualified on all grounds. What was even wrong was the fact that he was informed very late on the eve of election to prevent the possibility of raising an objection to this action and the election was thus held accordingly without allowing him to take part.

He therefore petitioned to the Court, and it was held that when the law talks of an opportunity to be heard being given to a party to a dispute, it meant "reasonable opportunity". Otherwise, the rule of Natural Justice expressed in the Latin maxim "Audi alteram partem" would be deemed to have been breached. Hence a communication on the eve of the election cannot be anything but a denial of a reasonably opportunity to challenge an objection.

The Court further fortified his grounds by holding that the compliance with the principle of natural justice is very important in all cases that are meant for adjudication, and therefore a Court will intervene even if the Court's jurisdiction is ousted once it is shown that a breach of the provision of Natural Justice is committed. The Court then will intervene in such circumstances to correct obvious injustice as it was done in Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Committee where Browne 1. stated as follows:

"It is a well established principle that a provision ousting the ordinary jurisdiction of the Court must be construed strictly, meaning, I think, that if such a provision is reasonably capable of having two meanings that meaning shall be taken which preserves the ordinary jurisdiction of the Court".

Witnesses and Natural Justice

It must also be noted that the principle of Audi alteram partem, enjoins that a Court must allow any person to call his witnesses and consider the case of the defendant however weak.

In addition to that, it is considered a breach of Natural Justice to keep on interrupting the defendant, and if his interests are thus in jeopardy, he must be allowed to call witnesses in the order that he thinks best. These broadly stated propositions have been supported by the following cases:

For instance in RE Enock⁵¹, it was held that undue interference by the Court tantamounts to a denial of justice. Also in the case of Malam Sadau of Kunya and Abdul Kadir of Fagge where the trial Court did not allow the appellant to call his witnesses who could bear out that the document he signed was done under force or pressure, the Appeal Court held this accordingly to be a breach of Natural Justice in the Circumstances. The Court of Appeal stated categorically thus:- "It is a fundamental principle of natural justice that a defendant and his witnesses should be heard before the case against him is determined and that the Chief Alkali's Court erred in not allowing the appellant to call his witnesses".

Hence, the appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The Rules of Natural Justice have been extended to cover many areas not necessary for a detailed discussion here, hence readers are enjoined to read OYEWO A.T.'s book entitled "The Concept and Application of Natural Justice in Nigeria ".

An order of Judicial review may even challenge the Locus Standi of the respondent. When then is the meaning of an application of Locus Standi in law?

Locus Standi

Locus Standi is a right to be heard by any person in Court or other proceedings. LOCUS STANDI literally means a place of standing; and  it is a right to be exercised only if the application falls within the previews of section 6(6) of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria. See Adesanya v. The President (1981 1 ALL N .L.R. 1.

It is one of the tributes of law that anybody who intends to take an  action against any party must of necessity be recognised and known to law. That is, he must be a legal person otherwise his case may be struck out.

Locus standi depicts and delimits the competence of any person to institute an action, and all judicial pronouncements have found inspiration and guidance from the constitution which states:

"The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section:

• Shall extend, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the constitution, to all inherent powers and sanctions of a Court of law; and
• Shall extend in all matters between persons, c between government or authority and any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relation thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person.

This section 6(6) states simpliciter that to entitle a person to correct standing in law, that person must show that his civil right and obligations have been injured.

This is very fundamental and cases like Irene Thomas v. Olufosoye(Pt. 18) with Amusa Momoh and Others v. Jimoh Olotu and Ors. (1970) 1 ALL NLR 117 have well expressed the principles.

If the plaintiff then has no Locus Standi, it means that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the matter and it must be struck out.

See Oloriode and Ors. (1984) 5 Sc. At page 28, Grogan v. Soremekun

(1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 44) 688 and 700, A.G.  Kaduna v. Hassan (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt 8) 483 and ChiefGani Fawehinmi v. Col. H. Akilu and Others (1987) 12 SC. 136-281.

CONCLUSION

It must be noted that the principle of natural justice enjoyed that a court must allow the other side to be heard i.e hear the other side. It is trite  law that the principle of fair hearing encompasses that the other side must be heard any breach of this law is against the principle of natural justice.

SUMMARY

In this unit, we have considered the issue of natural justice and the application through cases in Nigeria.

TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Explain the term ‘Natural Justice’.

REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

 See Kallo v. Daniel (1974) - (1975) 12 Sc. 175. Odofin v. Agu (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 229) 350.

A.G. (Federation) vs. Sode (1990) ] NWLR (Pt. 128) 500.

Madukolum v. Nkemdili (1962) 2 S.c. NLR. 341.

Osafile v. Odi (No.1) (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 137) 130.

Ajanaku v. Co.P. (1979) 3-4 Sc. 28.

Oloride v. Oyebi (1984) ~ Sc. NLR 390 1.

State v. Onagoruwa (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 221) 33.

Barclays Bank (Nig.) Ltd. v. C.B.N (1996) 6 Sc. 175.

Okafor v. A.G. Anambra State (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 169) 659.

Olaniyi v. Aroyehun (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 194) 652. Obikoya v. Registrar ofCompanies"(1975) 4 Sc. 31. Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank (1983) 1 Sc. NLR. 296. State v. Onagoruwa

Oredoyin v. Arowolo (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 114) 172 at P. 187.

Onyema v Oputa (1987) 3 NWLR) (Pt. 60) 259.

Ojokolobo v. Alanamu (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 377 at P. 391

Jfezue v. Mbadugha (1984) 5 SC. 79; (1984) 1 SVC NLR 427.

Odi v. Osafile (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 17.

Oyema v. Oputa (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 259.

Turkur v. Gavernment of Gongola (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117)517.

Management Enterprises Limited v. Otusanya (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 55) 179.

Oloba v. Akereja (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 84) 508.

Shonekan v. Smith (1964) 1 ALL NLR. 168 at 173.

Obikoya v. Registrar of Companies & anor. (1975) 4 SC. 31 at 34. Sken Consult Nig. Ltd. v. Godwin Secondy Ukey (1981) 1 SC."6 at 18. Akpene v. Barciays Bank Nig Ltd. and anor. (1977) 1 Sc. 47.

Abinabina v. Enyinadu (1953) A.c. 209 and 210.

Western Steel Works Ltd. v. Iron Steel Workers Union (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 30) 617.

Kalio v. Daniel (1979) 12 SC. 175.

Sule Katagun and Others i.e. Melvie Roberts v. Sule Katagun & anor.

(1967) 1 ALL NLR 129.

De Smith-Judicial review of Administrative article p 158. John Chapter 7 verse 51.

Genesis Chapter 4 verses 9-12.

1979 Federal Republic Constitution of Nigeria s.33.

Surinder Singh Kanda v. Government of Federation of Malaya (1962)

A.C. 322 at page 337.

Stephen Adedeji v. Police Service Commission (1967) I All NR 631.

Queen   v.    Local   Government   Eastern   Region,    Ex-Parte   Okafor Chigbana 2 FSC 46 at 49.

Buraima Ajayi and Julande Jos v. Zaria Native Authority (1964) NLR part II pages 61-65.

Adem Haji Jama v. The King (1948) A.c. 225.

Reg v. East Kerrier Justices Ex-Parte Munday (1942) 2 QB 719.

Alhaji Ramonu Bello and Dr. M.o. Thomson (1972) W.S.C.A. vvi II pages 43-56.

Maxwell v. Keun (1928) I KB 645 at p. 650.

Solanke v. Ajibola Sc. 96/97 unreported.

A.A. Odusote v. 0. 0. Odusote - SC 318170 - Unreported.

Tsaku v. The State (1986) 1 NWLR 519.

Demuren v. Asuni (1967) 1 A.N.L.R.  94.

Ngubdo v. The State (1973) N.N.L.R. 20.

Buraimo Ajayi & anor v. Zaria Native Authority (1964) N.N.L.R. 61.

Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Committee (1969) 2 AC 147 at page 161.

RE Enock 1 KB 327.

Malam Sadau of Kenya v. Abdul Kadir of Fagge (1956) vol. 1 FSC 39.

Adesanya v. The President (1981) 1 ALL N.L.R. 1.

Irene Thomas v. Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669 1986 N.W.L.R. (pt 18) 669;

Amusa Momoh and Others v. Jimoh Olotu and Ors. (1970) 1 ALL NLR 117.

Oloriode and Ors. (1984) 5 SC at page 28.

Orogan v. Soremekun (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 44) 688 and 700.

A.G. Kaduna v. Hassan (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt 8) 483.

Chief Gani Fawehinmi v. Col. H. Akilu and Others (1987) 12 SC.

136-281.