ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

 Contents

1.0       Introduction

2.0       Objectives

• Main Content
• Compensating Damage
• Nominal Damage
• Exemplary (or Punitive) Damages
• Aggravated Damages
• Contemptuous Damages
• General and Special Damages
• Assessment of Damages in Particular Tort (a) Negligence, (b) Personal Injuries, and (c) Special Damages

4.0       Conclusion

5.0       Summary

6.0       Tutor Marked Assignment

7.0       References and Further Readings

INTRODUCTION

The primary remedy for a tort is damages, the purpose of which is normally to compensate the plaintiff for the harm he has suffered as a result of the defendant’s tortuous conduct. This unit is concerned principally with the measure (assessment) of damages i.e. with the methods by which the court calculates the amount (quantum) of compensation to which the plaintiff is entitled in a given case.

OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this unit is to enable you to:

• understand the term “quantum of damages’ in which a plaintiff is entitled to in a given case;
• understand that the mode of assessment of damages differs from one tort to another;
• identify whether an action is for personal injuries or damage to property;
• learn about the applicable principle of law with respect to each tort

MAIN CONTENT

Compensating Damage

Nominal Damage

Exemplary (or Punitive) Damages

Aggravated Damages

Contemptuous Damages

General and Special Damages

Assessment of Damages in Particular Tort (a) Negligence, (b) Personal Injuries, and

(c) Special Damages

Negligence

Damages in this tort fall under three main headings, namely:

• personal injuries
• fatal accidents, and
• damage to property

Each of these must be considered in turn.

Personal Injuries

Special damage

As we have seen, special damage in actions for personal injuries includes loss and expenses incurred between the date of the accident and the date of judgement. Each item must be specifically pleaded and proved. Examples of special damage are: damage to clothing, damage to a vehicle, medical expenses, nursing fees, taxi fares to and from hospital, and loss of earnings during the period. (See p. 256, post). Under medical and nursing expenses, the plaintiff is entitled to claim the cost of treatment and care which he reasonably incurs as a result of his injuries. (See, e.g. Okolo v. Umoro (1973) W.S.C.A. 145, at pp. 147 – 152). Where the victim is nursed by a member of his family or a friend, he is entitled to the reasonable cost of such nursing services, even though he is not under any legal or moral obligation to pay the person who gives the services. (Cunningham v. Harrison (1975) Q. B. 942). In addition, a husband or father who incurs medical expenses on behalf of his injured wife or child, as the case may be, can himself recover those expenses from the tortfeasor. (Donnelly v. Joyce (1974) Q.B. 454).

General damage

This represents the loss to the plaintiff which cannot be precisely quantified. It includes all non-financial loss (past and future) and future financial loss. Items of general damage need not and should not be specifically pleaded, but some evidence of such damage is required. Heads of general damage are:

• pain and suffering
• loss of amenities
• loss of expectation of life
• future loss of earnings or earnings capacity
• future expenses.

In assessing general damages, a judge is not bound to refer to the established head of damage, and he may simply make a global award which takes into account the various items of loss or injury but which does not specify how much is being awarded under each head. Moreover, as Akibo Savage J. pointed out in Okuney Lagos City Council (1973) 2 CCHCJ 39, at p. 43:

“Turning now to general damages, the settled principle to be applied is that where injury is to be compensated by damages, the court should, as nearly as possible, get at that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured (or who has suffered) in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained or suffered the injury for which he is now to get compensation. In the case in hand, I ought to take into account the pain that the plaintiff suffered, the injury to his leg, and the handicap which he now suffers, in calculating the damages which, as far as money can do it, he should be paid for the loss he has suffered as the natural result of the wrong which has been done to him. In this respect, I have considered the fact that the plaintiff suffered a fracture of the left femur, as a result of which he was hospitalized for nearly three months, during which period he suffered pain…. I have also taken into consideration the fact that the plaintiff still suffers pain and that it is not advisable for him to drive his own car. The burden now rests on the plaintiff to procure the services of a professional driver. The plaintiff told me that he used to swim, play tennis and football. He said he could no longer do these things for reason of the injury to and shortening of his left leg.

Counsel on either side had referred me to several decided cases in which varying sums of money have been awarded in cases of injury of different classes of claimants. These cases can only serve as a guide. (Ejisun v. Ajao (1975) N.M.L.R. 4, at p. 7). I think the plaintiff here must be given a compensation which, so far as money can do it, will make up for his loss, proportionate to his injury, and such as will be a fair assessment in the opinion of the reasonable man.

Methods of Assessment of Damages

A “convenient starting point in the consideration of the quantum of damages” (Osholake v. Lagos City Council (1972) 12 CCHCJ 56, at p. 63, per Kazeem J.) in Fatal Accident claims which has frequently been taken by the Nigerian courts (Nwafor v. Nduka (1972) 4 S.C. 2, at p. 6; Owolo v. Olise (1967) F.N.L.R. 179, at p. 187, Osholake v. Lagos City Council, supra) is the following passage from the judgement of Lord Wright in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Colleries Ltd. (1942) A.C. 601, at p. 617:

There is no question here of what may be called sentimental damage, bereavement or pain and suffering. It is a hard matter of pounds, shillings and pence, subject to the element of reasonable future probabilities. The starting point is the amount of wages which the deceased was earning, the ascertainment of which to some extent may depend on the regularity of his employment.  Then there is an estimate of how much was required or expended for his own personal and living expenses. The balance will give a datum or a basic figure which will generally be turned into a lump sum by taking a certain number of years’ purchase. That sum, however has to be taxed down by having due regard to uncertainties, for instance, that the widow might have again married and thus ceased to be dependent, and other like matters of speculation and doubt.

The principles of assessment were further explained and illustrated by Begho J. in Owolo v. Olise (Supra) case in which a 50-year-old man was knocked off his bicycle and killed by a negligent motorist, leaving a widow and eight children (Ibid, at p. 188):

The number of years’ purchase is the multiplier. To get the lump sum, the number of years’ purchase is used in multiplying the annual value of the dependency. The annual value of dependency is arrived at by subtracting from the annual income and the annual amount required for the deceased’s personal upkeep, such as feeding and clothing expenses and money spent on things like drinks and cigarettes, etc.

Tax on the income or wages should also be subtracted.

The number of years’ purchase, or multiplier, is affected by many factors. Usually, most important factor is the age and expectation of life or working life of the deceased himself. He is the source of the dependency, which could not in any event have continued beyond the span of his life or working life. Another important factor is the possibility of remarriage in the case of a dependant widow. If she is young and attractive, the court may consider her marriage to be a strong possibility. If the widow is elderly as in this case (now 52 years old), or is of unattractive appearance of disposition, or suffers from some disability, or is encumbered with a large number of young children, the court may consider her chances by increasing the multiplier. So too the fact that there is no retiring age in the deceased’s job and that the job is not hazardous may increase the multiplier. (The job of a solicitor’s clerk is not hazardous and is one which a man may do till his death.) The future prospects of the deceased, if he had not been killed, will also affect the multiplier. If the deceased had good prospects of attaining a much greater wage or salary, or of achieving promotion to a much better position, the court will apply a higher

multiplier. However, in the present case before me, there is no evidence that the deceased had good prospects of promotion or attaining a much greater wage or salary.

Thus, as in actions for personal injuries, the ‘multiplier’ approach is employed. However, one difference is that in personal injuries cases, the muplticand is an estimation of the plaintiff’s annual loss or earnings, (see pp. 260, 261, ante) whereas in fatal accident claims it is an estimation of the annual value of the dependency, (Osholake v. Lagos City Council (1972) 12 CCHCJ 56, at p. 64, per Kazeem J.) i.e. of the amount which the deceased would have spent on his family. (See Ibolukwu v. Onoharigho (1964) 1 All N.L.R. 215, at p. 217 where the Supreme Court reduced the multiplicand because the trial judge had erroneously calculated it by reference to the total income of the deceased, whereas “the evidence did not support the view that she spent her whole income on maintaining her husband and children, and nothing on herself”). Thus, the multiplicand in a fatal accident claim is likely to be lower than in a personal injury claim. Furthermore, in choosing the appropriate multiplier in fatal accident claims, the age and health of the dependants and the uncertainties as to their future should be taken into account in addition to the age, health and future prospects of the deceased. (Ibid, Owolo v. Olise, supra, at p. 268). The multiplier also is therefore likely to be lower than in personal injury cases.

In Owolo’s case (1967) F.N.L.R. 179, the deceased was a law clerk of about 60 years of age. His widow was 52 and his surviving children were of between 10 and 32 years of age. Begho J. said (at p. 192):

The job of a law clerk is not a strenuous one, at least the job cannot be regarded as a hazardous one, even bearing in mind the uncertainties of life.  I therefore put the expectation of life at 14. Taking into consideration the expectation of life of the wife and the children, and also the fact that the wife’s chances on the ‘marriage mart’ are very slim, if not nil, and also the fact that there is no retiring age for a law clerk, I think the number of years’ purchase (or multiplier) should remain at 14.

In Osholake v. Lagos City Council (1972) 12 CCHCJ 56), the deceased was a 33-year-old assistant sales manager in a stationery supply company. His annual salary at the time of his death was ₤720. Kazeem J. accepted the plaintiff’s evidence that the deceased had been the sole breadwinner of his family, and that out of the ₤720 earnings he was spending ₤500 for the maintenance of his wife and two children. The learned judge continued (at p. 64):

The calculation of the multiplier is based on a number of factors, such as the life of the deceased himself, as he is the source of the dependency.  But one must also consider the expectation of life of the dependants and in particular, where a husband is killed, of his widow. Another factor is the possibility of remarriage in the case of a dependant widow. If she is young and attractive, the court may consider her remarriage to be a strong probability. The future prospects of the deceased, if he had not been killed, will also affect the ‘multiplier’, but the court must also take into account the uncertainties of life in cases where the deceased was engaged in some specially hazardous employment.

In the present case, very scanty evidence was adduced by the plaintiffs as to the expectation of the deceased’s working life. Apart from the age of the deceased, which was given at 33 years at the time of his death, and that he earned ₤720 per annum as assistant sales manager within the three years of his appointment,

the court was not told what further prospects the deceased has in the employment or how long he was expected to remain in such employment. I have therefore had very little assistance, if any, to enable me to decide the probable expectation of the deceased’s working life.

In the case of the widow’s possibility of remarriage, there is no doubt that she is young and very attractive, but she was not asked any questions as to her possibility of remarrying and I was urged by learned counsel for the plaintiffs to exclude this possibility from my consideration. In Buckley v. Ford (1967) 1 All E.R. 539), Philimore J. excluded that possibility from his consideration of quantum damages when no question of remarriage was asked from the widow; and the Supreme Court of Nigeria seemed to have approved the stand in Nwafor v. Nduka (1972) 4 S.C. 4. Hence, I cannot consider the possibility of the widow remarrying in the present case.

After considering a number of English cases in which multipliers of between 11 and 14 were applied when the deceased were in their thirties and were survived in each case by a wife and between on and three children, the learned judge continued:

In Nwafor v. Nduka (Ibolukwu v. Omoharigho (1964) 1 All N.L.R. 215, at 217, and in Oni v. Lagos City Council (1972) 10 CCHCJ 57, at p. 63), the Supreme Court of Nigeria approved the application of a multiplier of 12 years’ purchase applied by the lower court in the case of a deceased aged 28 years who left a young widow and two children.

After giving full consideration to the circumstances of the case, I have arrived at the conclusion that it would be reasonable to apply a multiplier of 12 years’ purchase in this case.

In the circumstances, on the basis of an annual value of dependency of ₤500, and a multiplier of 12 years’ purchase, the total damages that would have accrued to the dependants would be ₤6,000 (Ibolukwu v. Onoharigho, supra, at p. 217). But I have already found

That the deceased was 25 percent liable in causing the accident, hence This amount will be reduced to ₤4,500.

In Alliu Bello v. Attorney General of Oyo State (1986) 12 S.C. page 1, the deceased was executed by the squad of the Oyo State government and the Oyo State government was held vicariously liable for the action of the squad that executed the deceased. One of the issues that called for consideration at the Supreme Court is the formula to be adopted in the assessment of damages. The Supreme Court held that the formula for awarding damages is based on the expectation of the working life of a deceased scaled down to a number of years’ purchase and then multiplied by the amount in cash the deceased spent annually on his dependants during his life time.

Fatal Accidents

Where the victim of an accident caused wholly or partly by the defendant’s negligence dies as a result of his injuries, the dependants of the deceased may recover compensation for his death from the defendant under the following statutes:

Fatal Accidents Law 1961, Cap. 40 (Lagos State) Torts Law, Cap. 122 (Western States)

Fatal Accidents Law, Cap. 52 (Eastern States) Fatal Accidents Law, Cap. 43 (Northern States)

A preliminary question may arise in a fatal accident claim in Nigeria where the action is in respect of an accident which occurred in a state other than that of the forum, and where different statutes apply in two states. In Amanambu v. Okafor (1966) 1 All N.L.R. 205; (1967) N.M.L.R. 118), the widow of a man who was killed in a road accident which took place near Lokoja in the then Northern Region brought an action against the driver of the offending vehicle in the High Court of the Eastern Region on behalf of herself and certain other dependants of the deceased, claiming damages under the Fatal Accidents Law of Eastern Nigeria (Cap. 52). The Supreme Court held that the action must fail since “in our view, the Fatal Accidents Law of Eastern Nigeria confers a right to sue for compensation in respect of a fatal accident which occurred in Eastern Nigeria and not outside it: for the legislature of Eastern Nigeria could only legislate for compensation in regard to such an accident”. (at p. 207) However, the Court expressly left open the question as to whether the claim might have succeeded had it been based on the Fatal Accidents Law of Northern Nigeria (Cap. 43) instead of on the Eastern Nigeria statute. One year later, in Benson v. Ashiru (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 184), a differently constituted Supreme Court adopted a different approach. In this case, an action was brought to the Lagos High Court under the Fatal Accident Act 1846 (an English statute of general application then in force in the Federal Territory of Lagos) in respect of an accident which had occurred at Iperu, a town in the then Western Nigeria, where the Torts Law (Cap. 122) and not the Fatal Accident Act was in force. Without expressly disapproving Amanambu v. Okafor (Supra) the Supreme Court side-stepped that decision in the Lagos High Court, on the following grounds (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 184, at p. 188):

• Under the relevant English common law rules of private international law (Phillips v. Eyre (1870) 40 L.J.Q.B. 28), which applied in the High Court of Lagos, the latter court had jurisdiction over the action;
• It was necessary for the plaintiff to refer in his pleadings to the statute on which he relied (in this case the Torts Law Cap. 122). The plaintiff would not be debarred from relying on the Law on the ground that he had not pleaded it, since under section 73 (1) (a) of the Evidence Act (Cap. 62) the High Court must take judicial notice of the laws in force in any part of Nigeria, and it was unnecessary to plead matters of which the High Court takes judicial notice;
• No defence would have been available under the Torts Law which was not equally available on the action as framed;
• In any case, section 22 of the Supreme Court Act 1960 (No. 12) empowered the Supreme Court to amend any error or defect in the record over the proceedings as that of the trial court, which would include the power to permit the plaintiff to amend his writ by striking out references to the Fatal Accident Act 1846 and substituting references to the Torts Law Cap.

In Uko v. West African Portland Cement Co. Ltd. (1973) 9 CCHCJ 11 Odesanja J. decided that, in so far as Benson v. Ashiru (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 184 was difficult to reconcile with Amanambu

1. Okafor (1966) 1 All N.L.R. 205; (1967) N.M.L.R. 118) he preferred to rely entirely on the former case, and it is submitted with respect that he was correct in so deciding, for, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Benson’s case, the rules of private international law permit a court in one State to exercise jurisdiction over claims arising from torts committed in other States in defined circumstances. Furthermore, as Odesanya J. emphasised, there is ample authority for allowing such actions under the applicable Rules of Court.

The learned judge said (1973) 9 CCHCJ at p. 13):

The accident occurred in the Western State and there the cause of action arose. Nevertheless the action has been instituted here in Lagos State. Under Order VII, rule 4 of this Court’s Civil Procedure Rules, this suit, founded as it is on a tort, or rather statutory liability for fatal accidents, may be commenced and determined in the judicial division in which the defendants reside. In fact, under rule 5, even if the suit has been wrongly commenced here, I have a discretion whether to allow it to be determined here or not.

Persons entitled to benefit

The classes of dependant who are entitled to be compensated under the Fatal Accidents legislation are members of the deceased’s “immediate family”, which is defined in the statutes as including the deceased’s husband, wife or wives, parents and children (see Appendix post). The Fatal Accidents Law of the eastern states gives a wider definition which includes, in addition, the deceased’s brothers and sisters and the nephews and nieces of the deceased who were under the age of 16 at the time of the death and were being maintained by the deceased.

A case in which a claimant was held not to come within the definition of “child” in the Torts Law of the western states is Dogbo v. Akinwande (1974) 8 Nig. L.J. 134. Here the plaintiffs claimed damages as dependants of their deceased aunt, who had been in loco parentis to them. The lower court found that there was a gap in the Law since it failed to provide for persons in the position of the plaintiffs’ and went on to hold that since under the local customary law, the plaintiffs could be regarded as “children” of the deceased, they were entitled to claim under the law. The  Western State Court of Appeal, however, overruled this decision on the grounds:

• that, as a general rule, a court is bound to apply a statute as it stands and is not entitled to fill in what it regards as omissions or gaps;
• that the word “child” is defined in section 5 of the Torts Law, and it is within the confines of that definition that the court must determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim or not; and
• under the Torts Law the proper test for determining whether or not the plaintiff qualifies as a claimant is whether he or she is the husband, wife, parents or child of the deceased, and not whether he or she was in fact dependent upon the deceased (See also e.g. Oni v. Lagos City Council (1972) 10 CCHCJ 57 (niece unable to claim) and Okoroafor v. Adebayo (1977) 2 CCHCJ 243 (uncle unable to claim). Proof of dependency is, However, an additional requirement (see p. 271, post)

The statutes provide (See p. 310, post) that the action on behalf of the dependants must be brought within three years after the death, by and in the name of the executor or administrator of the deceased, but that (a) if there is no executor or administrator, or (b) if the executor or administrator does not commence an action within 6 months of the death, then any dependant who qualifies as a claimant under the Acts may sue in his own name on behalf of himself and the others.

(c)       Damage to Property

Where the plaintiff’s property is not lost, destroyed, or damaged in consequence of the defendant’s tort, the aim of the law is restitutio in integrum i.e. to restore the plaintiff as far as possible to the position he would have been in had the loss not been inflicted. (Armel’s Transport Ltd. V. Martins (1970) 1 All N.L.R. 27, at p. 32; Lagos City Council v. Unachukwu (1978) 1 LRN 142, at pp. 143, 144). The method of computation differs, however, according to whether it plaintiff’s property is (1) totally lost or destroyed, or (2) merely damaged and repairable (1978) 1 L.R.N., at p. 144).

Loss or destruction

The measure of damages in cases where the plaintiff’s vehicle is totally lost or destroyed by the defendant’s negligence was laid down in the leading case of Kerewi v. Odegbeson (1965) 1 All N.L.R. 95, at p. 99) to be “the value of the car at the time of the accident plus such further sum as would compensate the owner for loss of earnings and the inconvenience of being without a car during the period reasonably required for procuring another car”; and the same formula was applied to other classes of goods by the Supreme Court in Lagos City Council v. Unachukwu (1978) 1 L.R.N. 142, at p. 144.

Where the goods destroyed were not new at the time of the accident, e.g. where a used vehicle is “written-off” in a collision, there may be some difficulty in assessing its immediate pre-accident value. In Alabilogbo v. Sofowora (1972) 8 CCHCJ 21, the plaintiff’s Bedford lorry was destroyed in a collision with the defendant’s vehicle. Evidence was given as to the original cost of the vehicle, but none as to its value at the time of accident. Kazeem J. approached the matter thus (at p. 26):

It was held in Ubani-Ukoma v. Nicol (1962) 1 All N.L.R. 105 that the market value of a used chattel is the sum it would fetch under the state of things for the time being existing, and that it was a matter for estimation. In arriving at such estima- tion, its age, the mileage covered and the fact that such model as no longer available on the Nigerian market should be taken into consideration.

In the present case there was no evidence as to the vehicle’s mileage, but it was proved that the vehicle was about one-year old and net profits of ₤12 per day were claimed. The learned judge therefore concluded that “having regard to the extensive use that was made of the vehicle in realizing a sum of ₤4,500 within a year, I think it would be a fair estimate that the useful life of the vehicle could not be more than three years. On that basis I would estimate the market value of the plaintiff’s vehicle at the time of the collision as two thirds of the original value of the vehicle plus the cost of accessories”. 

In addition to the pre-accident value of the chattel, the plaintiff is also entitled to be compensated for any loss of earnings (e.g. where a commercial vehicle or taxi-cab is destroyed) and the inconvenience arising from his being deprived of the use of the chattel during the period reasonably required for procuring a replacement (Kerewi v. Odegbeson, supra). What is a reasonable period for acquiring a replacement will vary according to circumstances, but in all cases the plaintiff is under a duty to mitigate his loss (see Chukwu v. Uhegbu (1963) 2 All N.L.R. 209). In Maiwake v. Gassau (1972) 8 CCHCJ 21), Wheeler J. said:

It is a cardinal principle of law that a plaintiff must act reasonably in relation to the defendant so as to mitigate his loss, and it follows that the plaintiff in the present case was not entitled…to sit back and do nothing about replacing his lorry which had been written off’.

In Alabilogbo v. Sofowora (1972) N.N.L.R. 125) the plaintiff claimed loss of earnings in respect of his lorry for a period of eight months. Kazeem J. refused to uphold the claim, saying (at p. 27):

I am not convinced that it could have taken about six to eight months to get another vehicle in replacement for the defendant’s vehicle. The fact that the defendant had no money for the replacement seems to me immaterial, and if he had taken out comprehensive instead of third party cover on his vehicle, the insurance company could have borne the cost of the replacement ….. In the circumstances I would only award as loss of earnings a sum of ₤360 on the basis of ₤12 per day for 30 days.

Where the plaintiff claims special damages for the loss of a chattel, including loss of earnings, he must plead and prove strictly each item of loss, and if he fails to do so, his claim for special damages will fail. Thus, for example, in Maiwake v. Gassau, where the plaintiff claimed loss of earnings in respect of his destroyed lorry, Wheeler J. said (1971) N.N.L.R. 125, at p. 127:

The plaintiff’s evidence regarding the manner in which the daily profit/loss of ₤45 was arrived at was very much evidence of a general character indicating in general terms the work the plaintiff had been able to arrange for the lorry and the kind of profit he had been making with it. In particular, he gave or called no evidence showing that by reason of the accident he had been unable to undertake specific assignments for which the lorry had been engaged. Special damages, however, must be certain and strictly proved and, having regard to these matters, I am unable to find that there is satisfactory proof of the plaintiff’s claim for special damages for loss of profits totaling

₤10,485, and that claim accordingly fails.

This, however, is not the end to the matter, for even if the plaintiff’s claim for special damages fails, he may still recover general damages, provided he has pleaded them. (General Metalware Co. Ltd. V. Lagos City Council (1973) 2 CCHCJ 68, at p. 79). In Maiwake’s case (Supra), for instance, having rejected the claim for special damages, Wheeler J. went on to award general damages assessed on the principle that “the plaintiff is entitled to be awarded such sum as will fairly compensate him for the loss he has actually sustained” (The Hebridean Coast (1961) A.C. 545, at p. 562, per Devlin L.J). He therefore held as follows (1971) N.N.L.R. 125, at p. 128):

There was a reasonably certainty that the lorry would have been engaged to carry out four trips a month (but not five) from Kano to Lagos and back carrying produce, which would have earned for the plaintiff ₤305-5-0 for each return trip or ₤1,217 per month.

The costs of earning that sum have, of course, to be deducted. And the plaintiff’s evidence, which I accept (he was not cross-examined on these matters), is that he paid the driver wages and expenses of

₤23 per month, that he spent ₤43-15-0 per trip on fuel (or ₤175 per month) and ₤10 per month on engine oil, giving a grand total of

₤208 per month. Consequently the net profit per month could not have been more than about ₤1,010, and as that figure does not take account of such overheads and insurance vehicle licence and the cost of servicing, in my opinion a fair assessment of the net profit made by the lorry was ₤950 per month.

However, it has frequently been emphasised in the Nigerian courts that the plaintiff must not be doubly compensated, and if he has been awarded special damages for his loss, he is not entitled to an additional award of general damages (Chukwu v. Uhegbu (1963) 2 All N.L.R. 209 at p. 211 etc.). In Lagos City Council v. Unachukwu, Bello J.S.C., delivering the Supreme Court’s judgement said (Supra):

It has been stated by this Court in numerous cases that where a victim of a tort has been fully compensated under one head of damages for a particular injury, it is improper to award him damages in respect of the same injury under a different head… In Ezeani v. Njidike (Supra) Brett J.S.C. stated: “Although the measure of damages in an action in tort is not the same as in an action in contract, the rule against double compensation remains the same, and applies to both”. In the afore-mentioned case, the plaintiff claimed in an action for conversion the value of the goods converted and general damages. The trial judge awarded him both. This Court sets aside the award of general damages as being double compensation. Now, reverting to the case in hand, we are satisfied that the respondents have been fully goods

stolen and their loss of profits. We hold that the additional award as general damages is unjustified double compensation and it must be set aside.

CONCLUSION

In an action for damages for personal injuries there shall (a) in assessing those damages be taken into account against loss of earnings or profit which have accrued or probably will accrue to the injured person from the injuries, such proportion as the court may in all circumstances of the case consider just, of the value of any compensation which has been recovered or will be recovered by him.

SUMMARY

In this unit, we learnt about:

• the quantum of damages in which a plaintiff is entitled to in a given case;
• the mode of assessment of damages;
• several examples of the types of damages that we have e.g. nominal damages, general and special damages

TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Discuss the term quantum of damages in relation to tortuous act.
2. State the rule in Repolems and Furnas Witty & Co. (1921)

REFERENCES AND FURTHER READINGS

1. Bodunde Bankole Tort: Law of Wrongful Conduct: Lipservice Punishmnt (1998),
2. Fidelis Nwadalo: the Criminal Procedure of the Southern States of Nigeria, Mij Publisher, Ltd, Lagos (1996).
3. John G. Fleming: The Law of Torts (1977), The Law Books Co. Ltd publisher, London. Sweet &
4. Street: The Law of Torts Swet & Maxwell (1977), London
5. KODILINYE & Oluwole Aluko: Nigeria Law of Torts. Spectrum Law Publishers, 1999.

: The Criminal Procedure of the Northern States of Nigeria