RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING

CONTENTS

1.0	Introduction
2.0	Objectives
3.0	Main Content 3.1 Provision Dealing with Impartiality
	Bias and Likelihood of It             Civil Rights
	Fair Trial within a Reasonable Time             Authenticated Copies of Judgement
	Right to an Interpreter     Opportunity to Defend
	Right of Confrontation and Cross Examination             Right to Counsel
4.0	3.10    Compulsory Acquisition of Property Conclusion
5.0	Summary
6.0	Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0	References/Further Readings
	INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVES
 The right to fair hearing is, perhaps the most important of all guaranteed rights. It is the foundation on which other rights  rest  because it is at the root of the administration of both civil and criminal justice. In the first place it guarantees a right to a hearing; that is a right to access to courts and tribunals established by law whenever there is any question or dispute as to the rights or obligation of a person or whenever any person is charged with a criminal offence. In the second place, it imposes a duty on such courts and tribunals to act fairly, fearlessly, openly and impartially.

By the end of this unit, you should be able to:

identify all the provisions governing right to fair hearing.

MAIN CONTENT

If adjudications are to command general acceptability as having been properly made, they must possess the essential characteristics of openness, fairness and impartiality. And where government rests on the consent of the governed, the general acceptability of adjudication as possessing these essential characteristics is one of the vital elements in sustaining the consent of the governed. That is the political philosophy on which the right to fair hearing rests. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, section 36 also with both the civil procedure and criminal procedure.

It provides that in the determination of civil rights and obligations a person is entitled to fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or tribunal which is so constituted as to be independent or impartial while provisions are also made to ensure that the proceedings are held in public – in order to avoid what is known as cloistered justice.

What then is a fair hearing as decided by cases?

In Kotoye V. Central Bank of Nigeria and 7 Others (1989) the Supreme Court held that fair hearing anticipated by Constitution implies that every reasonable and fair minded observer who watches the proceedings should be able to come to the conclusion that the court or other tribunal has been fair to all the parties concerned.

Applying the principles in Mohammed V. Kano N. A. (1968), the apex court gave the following basic criteria and attributes of fair hearing which should include the followings:

• That the court or tribunal shall hear both sides not only in the case but also in all material issues in the case before reaching a decision which may be prejudicial to any party in the case;
• That the court or tribunal shall give equal treatment, opportunity and consideration to all concerned. See Adigun V. A.G. of Oyo State (1987);
• That the proceedings shall be heard in public and all concerned shall have access to and be informed of such a place of public hearing; and
• That having regard to all the circumstances in every material decision in the case, justice must not only be done but must be manifestly and undoubtedly seen to have been done. See  Deduwa V. Okorodudu (1976).

The rule of fair hearing is not a technical doctrine. It is one  of substance. The question is not whether injustice had been done because of lack of hearing. It is whether a party, entitled to be heard before deciding, had in fact been given the opportunity of hearing.

Once an appellate court therefore comes to the conclusion that a party was entitled to be heard before a decision was reached but was not given the opportunity of hearing, the order or judgement thus entered must be set aside.

Also note that the right to be heard in one’s own defence had been amplified by Denning M.R. in Surinder Singh Kanda V. Government of Federation of Malaya (1962) as follows:

“If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth something it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which has been given and what statements have been made affecting him, and then he must be given a fair opportunity to  correct or contradict them”.

See the following cases for further details:

Amadi V. Thomas Aplin & Co. Ltd. (1972) 4 SC. 228; Kano N.A. V. Obiora (1959) SC. NLR 577. The State V. Onagoruwa (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt.  221)  33; U.B.A.  Ltd.  V.  Achoru  (1990)  6  NWLR  (Pt.  156) 254;

Alhaji Umaru Abba Tukur V. Government of Gongola State (1989) 9 SCNJ 1 or (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517 and Stephen Adedeji V. Police Service Commission (1967) 1 ALL NLR 631 to mention a few.

Provision Dealing with Impartiality

This section of the Constitution also reinforces the fact that judges must see themselves as impartial umpires and they should have no business to descend to the arena of civil litigation. See Ezeain  Nnajiafor  and Others V. Linus Ukonu & others (1985) per Justice Bello JSC.

They should refrain at all times from telling Counsel what to do and  how to do it, otherwise they may be challenged for taking sides. See

A.E. Macchi SPA & Others V. A.L.S. Limited (1986).

In Kim V. State (1992) these duties of impartiality and fairness were re- echoed as follows:

“In our system of administration of justice, the judge must be and manifestly be seen to be an impartial umpire. He must maintaina balance between the two parties to the dispute.

Therefore, any act of his that can ground the conclusion that he has taken sides in the conflict vitiates the trial, while a trial studied with impartiality on one side is not fair hearing”. See Akinfe V. The State (1988) and Okoduwa V. The State (1988).

Fair hearing within the contemplation of sections 33 of the 1979 (i.e. section 36 of the 1999(Nigerian Constitution is a manifest epitome of even handed justice. Therefore a judge should remain an impartial umpire throughout the proceedings and allow parties to the conflict conduct their case on their own initiative.

It will be improper for a judge to take any step in any proceeding which has even the remote possibility of projecting an impression that the judge is handling the proceeding with a slant in favour of one side against  the                other.                See    Arubo   V.    Aiyelere   (1993);   Orizu   V. Anyaegbunam (1978) and Ojo V. Oseni (1987).

Bias and Likelihood of It

A judge should not be hostile to any of the parties before him. He  should not be a judge in his own case in order that the public confidence in the administration of justice may be fully maintained hence no man who has either a pecuniary or proprietary interest in a case before him should be allowed to adjudicate on it. See Metropolitan Properties Company (FG) Ltd. V. Lennon (1969).

In summary, it is now conceded that to disqualify a person from acting in a judicial or quasi judicial capacity upon the ground of interest (other than pecuniary or proprietary) in a subject matter of the proceedings, a real likelihood of bias must be made to appear not only from materials  in fact ascertained by the party complaining, but from such further facts as he might readily have ascertained and easily verified in the course of his disqualifications.

Note that the test for BIAS is whether there is a reasonable suspicion of bias when it is looked at from the objective standpoint of a reasonable person and not from the subjective standpoint of an aggrieved party.

Civil Rights

Since he who pays the piper dictates the tune, the granting of a privilege to anybody to operate a bank is not a civil right, for such a grant can be revoked subsequently on due course shown to the grantor.

This was an issue in the case of Merchant Bank Ltd. V.  Federal  Minister of Finance (1961), which stated that the appellant bank did not possess any “Civil Rights” within the meaning of the 1954 Constitution then in force and that all they possessed was a privilege to carry on banking business within the meaning of the Banking Ordinance and no more. And that the business can be determined in the manner provided for in the Ordinance if in the opinion of the Minister, an examination shows that the licensed bank is carrying on business in a manner detrimental to the interests of its depositors and other creditors, or has insufficient assets to cover its liabilities to the public, or is contravening the provisions of the Ordinance.

Fair Trial within a Reasonable Time

The constitution compels a person to be tried within a reasonable time. This in essence is to do away with the odious effect of delay in the administration of Justice.

This idea is salutary because delay usually defeats equity, for justice delayed is justice denied, and as a matter of fact, Harry Jones made the following scintillating comments on the bad effects of delay in judicial process:

“Delay causes hardship, delay brings our courts in disrepute,  delay  results  in   deterioration   of evidence through loss of witnesses, forgetful memories and death of parties and makes it less likely that justice will be done when a case is reached for trial”.

These points were well articulated in the case of O’Donell V. Watson Bros. Transportation Company (1960) in America which went on for twenty years – a pretty longtime; and see also the case of Ekeri V. Edo Kimisede (1976) where hearing in a case commenced on 20^th May, 1971 and dragged on after series of adjournment until 19^th July, 1973 when defence closed its case. Counsel addressed the Court in July and  August, 1973 but judgement was not delivered until 30^th November, 1974.

The Supreme Court accepted the submission of counsel to the Plaintiffs/ Appellants that owing to the many long intervals of delay in taking evidence and the long delay before delivering judgement the learned trial judge ought to be regarded as having lost his impression of the evidence and the advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses.

Authenticated Copies of Judgement

It is an important duty of a court delivering judgement to furnish all parties with duly authenticated copies on the date of the delivery of judgement under section 258 (1) of the 1979 Constitution (also Section 294 of the 1999 Constitution).

This section reads:

“Every court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than 3 months after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses, and furnish all parties to the case of the matter determined with duly authenticated copies of the decision on the date of the delivery thereof”.

But in Chief Adedapo Adekeye & Another V. Chief Akin Olugbade (1987) Oputa JSC adjudged that this provision is merely directory and not mandatory with regards to the giving of authenticated copies of the judgements on the date that the judgement is delivered. We therefore need more guidance on the interpretation of section 33(7) of the Constitution, 1979 (or section 36(7) of the 1999 Constitution) which provision concern criminal proceeds.

It reads:

“When any person is tried for any criminal offence,  the court shall keep a record of the proceedings and the accused person or any person authorised by him  in that behalf SHALL be entitled to obtain copies of that judgement in the case within 7 days of the conclusion of the case”.

It is the opinion of these authors that the provisions in this perspective are mandatory in criminal trials; See Olanrewaju V. Government of Oyo State and Others (1992) which deals with the meaning of the word “SHALL” in any enactment.

It states that the word SHALL in any enactment is PREDATORY rather than a mere DIRECTIVE, and compliance is therefore binding and not left to the discretion of the person to whom the enactment imposes the duty.

Right to an Interpreter

Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail of the nature of the offence.

In other words, the language must be properly interpreted to give him an opportunity to defend himself. For every person who is charged with a criminal offence, for example, shall be entitled to have without payment the assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand the language used at the trial of the offence.

Any negation of this principle therefore definitely contravenes not only the constitutional provision of Nigeria, but also the principle of Natural Justice. This was in fact established in the case of Buraima Ajayi and Julande V. Zaria Native Authority (1964) where the appellants successfully appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court’s refusal to interfere with their conviction in a Native Court on the ground that the interpretation in the Native Court had been unsatisfactory. The proceedings in the Native Court were in Hausa, which the appellants neither spoke nor understood. They were Yoruba speakers by birth and understood English, but not perfectly. The proceedings were interpreted into English and one into Yoruba. It did not appear what language the other interpreted into. None of them was sworn. The trial record gave their names but it did not appear how they came to be called on to interpret or who they were, except that one was a school boy another was an Ibo who spoke English but not Yoruba. Only one gave evidence in the High Court. The High Court found that in at least two occasions the ability of the interpreters satisfactorily might be questioned, but that in fact, the whole proceedings has been interpreted correctly.

On appeal it was held amidst all other facts that this was wrong. It deprived the appellants of their constitutional rights, and that it contravened the principles of natural justice which demand that justice needs not only be done but must be manifestly seen done.  Put  succinctly the Supreme Court held as follows:-

“It was essential to be satisfied that the appellants had a  fair    opportunity   to   defend  themselves      and     in particular that they were accorded in full the right conferred by section 21 (5)(c) of the Constitution of  the Federation, which requires that there shall be adequate interpretation to the accused person of anything  said               in   a language      that   he   does      not understand, and equally that there shall be adequate interpretation to the Court of anything said by the accused person in a language that the Court does not understand.    The Court further held that there is a failure of justice within the meaning of section 382 of the Criminal Procedure Code, if the proceedings at  the trial fall short of the requirement not only that justice be done but that it may be seen to be done, as that           maxim    has    been    applied           by  the                 Judicial Committee in Adan Haji jama V. The King (1948) and by the Queen’s Bench Division in such cases as Rex East Kerier    Justice    Ex-parte    Munday (1942)”.

Opportunity to Defend

The Constitution under the Fundamental Human Rights provides that a person charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence.

This means that if for any special reason he can not defend himself properly without an adjournment, the court should grant him legitimate adjournment. See Alhaji Ramonu Bello V. Dr. M.O. Thompson,  Maxwell V. Keun (1928); Solanke V. Ajibola (1996/97). See  A.T. Oyewo, in his book titled “Cases and materials on the Principle of Natural Justice”.

Therefore where in a given case it is conclusively established that the trial has been conducted in such a way as to lead but to the conclusion that an accused person was not offered adequate opportunity to put across his case, as for example, when an application for adjournment  has been unreasonably or capriciously refused, or that the right to call a witness whose evidence is material to the just determination of the case has been denied, a Court of Appeal will undoubtedly interfere with the judgement of the trial court and hold that a failure of justice has been occasioned.

Lastly, it must be emphasised that a person standing trial must be allowed to call any witness to testify in his or her favour without any hindrance.

In summary, the following safeguards are available to an accused in a criminal trial:

• An accused shall be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty
• An accused has a right to be informed promptly of the nature of the offence in the language that he understands.
• He has a right to be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence, Gokpa V. I.G.P. (1961). Where the accused was brought from Port Harcourt without his counsel and an application for adjournment of trial was refused by the trial court. It was held that there was no fair
• An accused has a right to defend himself in person or by a counsel of his choice. But in Awolowo V. Federal Minister of Internal Affairs (1962) and Awolowo V. Sarki (1962) was held that a counsel means a Nigerian that is enrolled to practice in Nigeria and one that is free to enter Nigeria without prohibition.
• Also an accused has a right to examine witnesses called by the prosecution and obtain the attendance of witnesses in his favour on the same condition as those applying to prosecution
• An accused has a right to, without payment, the assistance of an interpreter if he can not understand the language used at the trial. See Ajayi V. Zaria N.A. (1964).
• He has also a right to obtain copies of the judgement within 7 days – Note in this regard that section 258(1) of the
• An accused can not be convicted for an offence that did not constitute an offence at the time of the act or
• An accused can not be tried a second time for an offence for which the accused had been previously convicted or acquitted and or
• Right not to be compelled to give evidence at the trial is accorded to an accused
• Right not to be convicted for an offence not defined by law is also available to an accused i.e. accused can only be charged with a statutory offence. In Aoko V. Fagbemi (1961) High Court quashed the conviction of the appellant by a Customary court for the offence of “committing adultery by living with another man without judicial separation”.

Right of Confrontation and Cross Examination

It is a fundamental rule of natural justice that a man charged before any tribunal should know the nature or full particulars of the charges against him before the trial. He should be given copies of the evidence taken without him, and he should be permitted to make cross examinations on them, otherwise justice is not done. In other words, he must be give adequate opportunity to know the case he has to meet and failure to supply him with a full statement of the facts or evidence upon which a panel and eventually a tribunal relied will be a denial of justice and a breach of the rules of Natural Justice.

This was the ratio decidendi of the Federal Supreme Court in the case of Denloye V. Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (1965).

In this case, it was alleged that Denloye issued Certificates of fitness on various dates to three different persons after collecting monies from  each one of them, and without examining them. He was preferred these charge; but instead of allowing him to be present before a panel who took evidence on this, evidence was taken without him, and the matter was eventually brought before the tribunal. At the tribunal, his counsel urged for the production of evidence which was said to be confidential and this he was refused; nor were even the witnesses recalled. He was found guilty and he appealed accordingly.

The Federal Supreme Court held that while it is not in dispute that any tribunal of this nature is entitled to decide its own procedure and lay down its own rules for the conduct of inquiries regarding discipline as was decided in R.V. Central Tribunal Ex-Parte Parton, it is of the utmost importance that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the principles of Natural Justice. The court further referred to the case of Russel V. Duke of Norfolk (1949) and the words of Tucker L.J. (as he then was) who said:-

“The requirement of natural justice must depend on  the circumstances of the case, the nature of the  inquiry, the rule under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with and so forth”.

Surely the appellant in the present case was entitled to know the nature of the evidence given against him on the 7^th August, 1967 before the panel; and it was wrong to withhold this evidence from him.

Referring to such right, the Privy Council in the case of Kanda V. Governor of the Federation of Malaya (1962) was quoted as follows:

“If the right to be heard is to worth anything, it must carry with it the right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him, and then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them”.

As a result of all the above propositions, the Supreme Court held that justice has not been done to the appellant and therefore allowed his appeal.

Right to Counsel

The constitutional provision states that every person who is charged  with a criminal offence shall be entitled to defend himself in person or by legal practitioners of his own choice.

The interpretation of this provision was vividly curtailed in the case of Awolowo V. Federal Minister of Internal Affairs (1962) where Mr. Gratiaen was refused entry into Nigeria by an immigration officer through the directive of the Federal Minister of Internal Affairs; and consequently was unable to defend the plaintiff. As a result the plaintiff complained that the refusal is prejudicial to his best interest as  his liberty is in jeopardy.

The Plaintiff further complained that this refusal was a denial of his constitutional right as provided for in section 21(5)(c) of the second schedule to the Nigerian (Constitutional Order in Council 1960).

But the Court held that the provision referred to was never intended to be invoked in support of the expensive undertaking of importing  lawyers whether British or otherwise into Nigeria.

The Court further held that section 21(5)(c) of the Constitution is  subject to certain limitation as follows:-

“It is clear that any legal representative chosen must not be under a disability of any kind. He must be someone who, if outside Nigeria, can enter the country as of right, and he must be someone enrolled to practice in Nigeria. For if the legal representative can not enter Nigeria as of right, and he has no right of audience in the Nigerian Courts then he is under disability”.

…………………….The     Constitution          is   a Nigerian Constitution meant for  Nigerians  in Nigeria.   It only runs in Nigeria.   The natural consequence of this is that     the     legal    representative    contemplated    in section   21(5)(c)   ought   to    be    someone   in Nigeria, and not outside.

Compulsory Acquisition of Property

All public administrators must respect the fundamental right to own properties. Therefore if any piece of land is needed by any government for public purposes, it may be compulsorily acquired, while adequate compensation should be given to the owner of the land compulsorily acquired.

Please note that the quantum of compensation is always based on the value of the land as at the time of acquisition.

As a matter of fact the English law recognises the presumption against confiscation of property without adequate compensation; as it was revealed by Lord Atkinson thus in the case of Central Control Board Liquor Traffic V. Canon Brewery Company Limited (1819).

“That Canon is that an intention to take away the property of a subject without giving him a legal right to compensation for the loss of it is not to be imputed to the legislature unless that intention is expressed in unequivocal term”.

The Nigerian law supports this view and by Decree No. 33 of 1976 it provides for interest also to be paid apart from compensation once a person has given up possession of his property as a result of compulsory acquisition.

Section 6 of the Decree states as follows:

“Where an owner of an estate or interest in land compulsory acquired is required to yield  up possession of his estate or interest in land prior to the payment of compensation or provision of alternative accommodation, as the case may be.

Interest at the bank rate shall be payable on the value of the estate or interest acquired (as determined pursuant to this Decree) for the period between the entry on the land and the  payment  of  compensation or the provision of alternative accommodation”.

This is also supported by the case of Malewood Pulp & Paper V. Newsbrunswick Electric Corporation Limited (1928) which provides for interest after possession has been taken on any compulsory acquisition embarked upon unless otherwise statutorily directed.

CONCLUSION

The provisions of the fundamental human rights are compelling,  salutary and a sine-qua-non for the organic growth of any civilized and democratic nation. They do determine like a barometer  or  as ambidexter the success or failure of any particular government. They  are indeed promotive of democracy and in fact enemies of despotism. They have been likened to be pivots upon which a successful government stands and grows for without them a particular government may be sterile, vindictive and odious in the estimation of the right thinking members of its society.

Therefore the more they are allowed to exist in the statute books in any country the better and satisfying that particular government will be, for any curtailment of them usually exposes a government to ridicule, opprobrium and dysfunctionalism.

The idea of fundamental human rights has been discussed at length of having episcopal origin for they have been acclaimed to be in existence before the birth of the law. And that was why it was held in Joseph Garang xors v. The Constituent Assembly, High Court Cs/93/1965 (unreported) that the fundamental human rights were not created by the state but are external and of universal institution, common to all mankind and ante-dating the state and founded upon natural law.

But be that as it is, there have been scholastic discussions on the justifiability of retaining these rights in the statute books of any permanency and at all times immutable hence it has been opined that there is an inbuilt tendency to erode upon or curtail some of these provisions during emergency periods.

Thus if a particular government sees reason in suspending any or part of the so-called fundamental human rights, it can do so for the smooth running of the government. The test therefore is subjective for each particular case must be considered according to its circumstances.

Therefore, in order to restrict or regulate freedom, the State is imperatively bound to use the system of either repression or prevention.

It was conceded by the International Commission of Jurists in 1962 that in a free society, preventive measures are considered legitimate to re- establish law and order if the latter has been disturbed, or in order to ward off grave dangers which menace it in a direct and imminent fashion.

SUMMARY

The summation of this therefore is that any government is free to suspend the fundamental freedom whenever it deems it fit to do so, and a typical example was seen when the Spanish government suspended Article 14 of the Charter by the decree of June 8, 1962 thus depriving Spanish people for two years of the right to establish freely their place  of residence on national territory.

Also by virtue of Article 35 of the Charter of the Spanish people, the enforcement of Articles: 12 – freedom of expression and of the press, 13

– inviolability of correspondence, 14 – freedom of residence, 15 – inviolability of domicile, 16 – freedom of assembly and association, and

18 – Immunity from detention, may be temporarily or partially suspended by the government. These were usually done by means of decrees which strictly limit the application and duration of such measures.

A similar provision is contained in the 1979 Nigerian Constitution  which provides for restriction and derogation from fundamental human rights. Here, section 41 reads: - Nothing in sections 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of this Constitution shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.

(a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order

or        (b)       public morality or protecting the rights of freedom of other persons.

and (2)                       …………………no Act shall be invalidated by reason only that it provides for the taking during periods of emergency, of measures that derogate from the provisions of section 30 or 32 of the Constitution…………All measures taken to derogate from fundamental human rights are justifiable to the extent that those measures are reasonably justiciable for the purpose of dealing with the situation that exists during that period of emergency.  This provision was re-enacted  in section 45 of the 1999 Constitution.

TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

What do you understand by the right to freedom of property?

REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Sir IVOR Jennings was reported in Messrs Wade and Philips – Cabinet Government.

Queen V. Lamsatef (1977) 2 AER 835.

Kotoye V. Central Bank of Nigeria and 7 Others (1989) 1 NWLR 429. Mohammed Vs. Kano N. A. (1968) 1 ALL NLR 424.

Adigun Vs. A. G. of Oyo State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 5). Deduwa Vs. Okorodudu (1976) 10 SC. 329.

Surinder Singh Kanda Vs. Government of Federation of Malaya (1962) A. C. 322 at 337.

Amadi Vs. Thomas Aplin & Co. Ltd. (1972) 4 SC. 228.

Kano N. A. Vs. Obiora (1959) SCNLR 577 or (1959) 4 FSC. 226.

The State V. Onagoruwa (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 221) 33.

U.B.A. Ltd. V. Achoru (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 156) 254.

Tukur V. Government of Gongola State (1989) 9 SCNJ 1 or (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517.

Stephen Adedeji Vs. Police Service Commission (1967) 1 ALL NLR 631.

Ezeala, Nnajia V. Linus Ukonu (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 686 at 697.

(1)       A. E. Macchi SPA & Others Vs. A. L. S. Ltd. (1986) 2 NWLR 443 at 444.

Kim. V. State (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 233) 17.

Akinfe Vs. The State (1988) NWLR (Pt. 85) 229.

Okoduwa V. The State (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 77) 333 at 347.

Aruba Vs. Aiyele (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 280) 126.

Orizu Vs. Anyaegbunam (1978) 5 SC. 21.

Ojo V. Oseni (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 66) 622 at 625.

Metropolitan Properties Company FG. Ltd. Vs. Lennon (1969) 1 QB 577 at 598.

Merchant Bank Ltd. Vs. Federal Minister of Finance (1961) 1 ALL NLR 598.

O’Donell V. Watson Bros. Transportation Company 183 F. Supp. 577, 581, (End III 1960).

Ekeri Vs. Edo Kimisede (1976) NMLR 194.

Chief Adedapo Adekeye and Another Vs. Chief Akin Olugbade (1987) 6 SC. 268 at page 298.

Olanrewaju V. Government of Oyo State & Others (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 265) 335 at page 349 

Buraima Ajayi and Julande Vs. Zaria Native Authority (1964) NRNLR (Pt. 11) pages 61 – 65.

Adam Haji Jama V. The King (1948) A. C. 225.

Reg. Vs. East Kerrier Justice Ex-Parte Munday (1942) 2 QB. 719. Bello V. Dr. M.O. Thompson (1972) W.S.C.A. Volume II pp. 43 – 56. Maxwell Vs. Keun (1928) 1 KB. 645 at page 650.

Solanke Vs. Ajibola – SC 96/97 unreported. Gokpa V. I.G.P. (1961) 1 All NLR 423.

Awolowo V. Federal Minister of Internal Affairs (1962) LLR. Ajayi Vs. Zaria N. A. (1964) NMLR 61.

Aoko V. Fagbemi (1961) ANLR 400.

Denloye Vs. Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal Suit No. SC/91/1965 of November 22 Vs. Central Tribunal, Ex-Paarte Parton 32 TLR 476.

Russel Vs. Duke of Norfolk (1949) 1 ALL E.R. 109 at 118.

Kanda Vs. Governor of the Federation of Malaya (1962) A. C. 322 at 337.

Awolowo Vs. Federal Minister of Internal Affairs (1962) LLR 177. Central Control Board Liquor Traffic Vs. Canon Brewery Company

Ltd. (1819) A. C. 744 at page 757.

Malewood Pulp Paper Vs. Newbrunswick Electric Corporation Ltd. (1928) A. C. 492.