Limitation Law (101)
HELD:
"It is difficult in those events that unfolded not to agree with the respondent that the cause of action in this suit had accrued not later than 2002, by which time the appellants were out of time to invoke the judicial powers of the Court.
HELD:
"...Taking the above analogy runs counter to when this Court reiterated that time could be said to have begun to run in the case of Jallco Ltd v Owoniboys Technical Services Ltd (1995) 4 NWLR (pt 391 534) to:
HELD:
"As aptly reiterated in HASSAN VS ALIYU (supra); when an issue of limitation of time to institute an action is raised, it is a preliminary issue touching on the competence of not only the action, but of the Court before which the action pends.
HELD:
"Indeed, the doctrine is well settled beyond peradventure, that the law provides for commencing an action within a prescribed period in regard to a cause of action accruing to the plaintiff, proceeding shall not (ought not) be brought after the time so prescribed by the statute (has lapsed).
HELD:
"The general principle of law is that, where the law provides for the filing of an action within a prescribed period in respect of a cause of action or appeal accruing to a plaintiff or appellant, such action or appeal shall not be brought after the time prescribed by the law had expired.
HELD:
"The rationale behind limitation laws and its enforcement was eloquently stated by Edozie, JSC in AREMO II vs. ADEKANYE (2004) 13 NWLR (PT 891) 572 at 592-593 as follows:
HELD:
"Section 1 of the Limitation Law, Cap. 80, Laws of Rivers State, 1988 stipulates as follows:
HELD:
"Totidem verbis, in ascertaining whether an action is statute barred, the Court looks at the date when the action was instituted and the date when the cause of action arose.