Interpretation of Statutes (295)
HELD:
"Without prejudice to the applicable principle relating to scrivener's errors, I must be quick to say that it is trite that the duty of the Court is to interpret the provisions of the relevant laws, not to amend, add to or subtract from the provisions enacted by the legislature.
HELD:
"However, the general rule of the thumb in interpretation of statutes is that when the language, terms, intent, or words used in any enactment are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their ordinary meaning unless this would led to absurdity or be in conflict with some other provisions thereof.
HELD:
"The basic function of the Court is to interpret the law and the general method was stated earlier in this judgment which is where the words used in a legislation or statute are clear and unambiguous in their ordinary meaning, effect should be given to them without resort to any external aid.
HELD:
"It is settled that an appellate would ordinarily not interfere with the evaluation of evidence by a trial Court except certain conditions exist.
HELD:
"It is trite that the express mention of one thing in a statutory provision automatically excludes any other which otherwise would have applied by implication with regard to the same issue.
HELD:
"It is pertinent to state that the position taken by the Lower Court is in accordance to settled principle laid down by this Court on the interpretation of Statutes wherein the following guide lines are clearly spelt out that:- 1)
HELD:
"The law is explicit that where an interpretation of a Statute would defeat the cause of justice, the Court should refrain there from.
HELD:
"The law is settled that in the interpretation of Statutes, where the words are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their natural and ordinary meaning.
HELD:
"As rightly submitted by the learned counsel to the 1st and 2nd respondent, the law is well settled that when a particular Section of the law has many Subsections, all such Subsections must be read together for purpose of discovering the intention of the lawmaker.
HELD:
"As rightly stated by learned senior counsel for the appellant, the golden rule of interpretation of statutes is that where the words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their natural and ordinary meaning, unless to do so would lead to absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the statute.